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The Development of Digital Forensics Workforce Competency on the Ex-
ample of Estonian Defence League 
Abstract: 
In 03.07.2014 Regulation No. 108 was introduced which regulates the conditions and pro-
cedure of the involvement of the Estonian Defence League (EDL) Cyber Defence Unit 
(CDU) in ensuring cyber security. This means that EDL can be brought in by the Infor-
mation System Authority, Ministry of Defence or the authorities of its area of government 
within the scope of either of their tasks e.g. ensuring the continuity of information and com-
munication technology infrastructure and in handling and solving cyber security incidents 
while applying both active and passive measures. In January 2018 EDL CDU’s Digital Ev-
idence Handling Group had to be re-organized and, thus, presented a proposal for internal 
curriculum in order to further instruct Digital Evidence specialists. While describing the 
CDU's tasks, it was noted that the CDU's partner institutions / organizations have not 
mapped out their specialists’ current competencies. With this in mind, we set out to create 
a comprehensive list of needs and constraints (taking into account the community standards 
of DF) to develop a DF-based competence framework that supports the development of 
CDU professionals. Hence, we studied the current situation of CDU, their existing training 
program, and   contemplated which features we need to consider and explore for further 
development. In order to assemble comparable results and to achieve the goal the model had 
to be able to solve the 5 following tasks: 1. Competency mapping, 2. Goal setting and reas-
sessment, 3. Scheduling the training plan, 4. Accelerating the recruitment process, and 5. 
Promoting the continuous development of professionals. The framework was developed on 
the basis of the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) Cybersecurity 
Workforce Framework (NICE Framework), which was revised to meet the needs of DF 
specialists, including EDL CDU. Additions were supplemented in terms of levels, speciali-
zation, and job descriptions. The proposals included the DF limitations and standards intro-
duced in the work, which ultimately resulted in a proposal for a Digital Forensics Compe-
tency ontology, EDL CDU structure change, Suggested Instructional Strategies for Digital 
Forensics Use With Each Level of revised Bloom's Taxonomy, a new DF standard subdivi-
sion – Unmanned Systems Forensics, and Digital Forensic Competency Model Framework. 
The list of tasks and skills were compiled from international certification distribution organ-
izations and curricula, and their focus on DF Specialist Competencies. Mini-Delphi or Esti-
mate-Talk-Estimate (ETE) techniques were applied to evaluate the proposed model. An in-
itial estimation of competencies and priorities were given to the EDL CDU partner institu-
tions for expert advice and evaluation. Considering the feedback, improvements were made 
to the model and a proposal was put forward to the CDU with a future work plan. In general, 
the proposed competence framework describes the expected scope of competence of an DF 
specialist in the EDL CDU to enhance their role as a rapid response team. The framework 
helps in defining the expected competencies and capabilities of digital forensics in practice 
and offers guidance to the experts in the choice of specialization. The proposed model takes 
into account the long-term effect (hire-to-retire). Due to the complexity of the model, the 
framework has a long implementation phase — the maximum time frame for achieving the 
full effect for the organization is expected to be 5 years. These proposals were approved by 
EDL CDU and the proposed plan was first launched in April 2019. 
Keywords: 
Criminal proceedings, Cyber Crime, permanent education, Cyber security, Information 
technology. CERCS: S281 - Computer-assisted education, S149 - Criminal proceedings, 
S280 - permanent education, P170 – Cyber security, Information technology. 
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Lühikokkuvõte: 
03.07.2014 kehtestati Vabariigi Valitsuse määrus nr. 108, mis reguleerib Kaitseliidu kaasa-
mise tingimusi ja korda küberjulgeoleku tagamisel. Seega võivad Kaitseliidu küberkaitse 
üksuse (KL KKÜ edaspidi KKÜ) kutsuda olukorda toetama erinevad asutused: näiteks Riigi 
Infosüsteemide amet (RIA), infosüsteemi järelevalveasutus või kaitseministeerium või selle 
valitsemisala ametiasutused oma ülesannete raames. KKÜ-d saab kaasata info- ja sideteh-
noloogia infrastruktuuri järjepidevuse tagamisel, turvaintsidentide kontrollimisel ja lahen-
damisel, rakendades nii aktiivseid kui passiivseid meetmeid. KKÜ ülesannete kaardistami-
sel täheldati, et KKÜ partnerasutused / organisatsioonid ei ole kaardistanud oma spetsialis-
tide olemasolevaid pädevusi ja sellele lisaks  puudub ülevaade digitaalse ekspertiisi kogu-
konnas vajaolevatest pädevustest. Leitut arvesse võttes seati ülesandeks vajadustest ja pii-
rangutest (võttes arvesse digitaalse ekspertiisi kogukonda kujudavaid standardeid) ülevaat-
liku pildi loomine, et töötada välja digitaalse ekspertiisi kompetentsipõhine raamistik, mis 
toetab KKÜ spetsialistide arendamist palkamisest pensionini. Selleks uurisime KKÜ ja 
nende olemasolevate koolitusprogrammide hetkeolukorda ning otsustasime milliseid oma-
dusi peab edasise arengu tarbeks uurima ja kaaluma. Võrreldavate tulemuste saamiseks ja 
eesmärgi täitmiseks pidi koostatav mudel olema suuteline lahendama 5-t järgnevat üle-
sannet: 1. Oskuste kaardistamine, 2. Eesmärkide seadmine ja ümberhindamine, 3. Koolitus-
kava planeerimine, 4. Värbamisprotsessi kiirendamine ning 5. Spetsialistide kestva arengu 
soodustamine. Raamistiku väljatöötamiseks võeti aluseks National Initiative for Cyber-
security Education (NICE) Cybersecurity Workforce Framework (NICE Framework) päde-
vusraamistik mida parendati digitaalse ekspertiisi spetsialistide, ja käesoleval juhul ka KKÜ, 
vajadusi silmas pidades. Täiendusi lisati nii tasemete,  spetsialiseerumise kui ka ülesannete 
kirjelduste kujul. Parenduste lisamisel võeti arvesse töös tutvustatud digitaalse ekspertiisi 
piiranguid ja standardeid, mille lõpptulemusena esitati KKÜ-le Digitaalse Ekspertiisi Päde-
vuse ontoloogia, KKÜ struktuuri muudatuse ettepanek, soovitatavad õpetamisstrateegiad 
digitaalse ekspertiisi kasutamiseks (muudetud Bloomi taksonoomia tasemetega), uus digi-
taalse ekspertiisi standardi alajaotus – Mehitamata Süsteemide ekspertiis ja Digitaalse Eks-
pertiisi Pädevuse Mudeli Raamistik. Ülesannete ja oskuste loetelu koostati rahvusvaheliselt 
tunnustatud sertifitseerimis-organisatsioonide ja erialast pädevust pakkuvate õppekavade 
abil. Kavandatava mudeli hindamiseks kasutati mini-Delphi ehk Estimate-Talk-Estimate 
(ETE) tehnikat. Esialgne prognoos vajaduste ja prioriteetidega anti KKÜ partnerasutustele 
saamaks tehtud töö kohta ekspertarvamusi. Kogu tagasisidet silmas pidades tehti mudelisse 
korrektuurid ja KKÜ-le sai vormistatud ettepanek ühes edasise tööplaaniga. Üldiselt kirjel-
dab väljapakutud pädevusraamistik KKÜ spetsialistilt oodatavat pädevuse ulatust KKÜ-s, 
et suurendada nende rolli kiirreageerimisrühmana. Raamistik aitab määratleda digitaalse 
ekspertiisi eeldatavaid pädevusi ja võimekusi praktikas ning juhendab eksperte spetsialisee-
rumise valikul. Kavandatud mudeli juures on arvestatud pikaajalise mõjuga (palkamisest 
pensionini). Tulenevalt mudeli komplekssusest, on raamistikul pikk rakendusfaas – organi-
satsiooni arengule maksimaalse mõju saavutamiseks on prognoositud ajakava maksimaal-
selt 5 aastat. Antud ettepanekud on käesolevaks hetkeks KKÜ poolt heaks kiidetud ning 
planeeritud kava rakendati esmakordselt 2019 aasta aprillikuus. 
Võtmesõnad: 
Arvuti õpiprogrammide kasutamise metoodika ja pedagoogika, kriminaalõigus ja -protsess, 
elukestev õpe, küberturvalisus, infotehnoloogia.  
CERCS: S149 – kriminaalõigus ja -protsess, S280 – elukestev õpe, P170 – küberturvalisus, 
infotehnoloogia. 
  
4 
List of Acronyms and Definitions 
CCDCOE NATO Cooperation Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence 
CERT  Computer Emergency Response Team 
CIRC  Computer Incident Response Capability 
CNSS   Committee on National Security Systems  
CompTIA The Computing Technology Industry Association 
CSIRT  Computer Security Incident Response Team 
DFFID  Digital Forensics Framework for Instruction Design 
EASS  Estonian Academy of Security Sciences 
EDL CDU  Estonian Defence League Cyber Defence Unit 
ENFSI  European Network of Forensic Science Institutes 
ENISA European Union Agency for Network and Information Security 
ESI  Electronically Stored Information 
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FE  Functional Exercise 
FSE  Full-Scale Exercise 
GDPR  General Data Protection Regulation 
HDD  Hard disk drive 
HMS  Administrative Procedure Act 
IoT  Internet of Things 
IRT  Incident Response Team 
ISACA Information Systems Audit and Control Association 
ISC2  The International Information System Security Certification Consortium 
KAPO  Estonian Internal Security Service 
KrMS   Code of Criminal Procedure 
MoD  Ministry of Defence 
MP  Military Police 
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NCIRC NATO Computer Incident Response Capability 
NICCS  National Initiative for Cyber security Careers and Studies 
NIST   National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NSA   National Security Agency  
OSINT Open-source Intelligence 
RIA  Estonian Information System Authority 
RRT  Rapid Reaction Team 
SANS  Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies 
SERT  Security Emergency Response Team 
TalTech Tallinn University of Technology 
TTX  Tabletop Exercise 
UT  University of Tartu 
VTC  Video Teleconferencing  
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1 Introduction 
“Digital Forensics (DF) collects, processes, preserves, analyses, and presents computer-re-
lated evidence in support of network vulnerability mitigation and/or criminal, fraud, coun-
terintelligence, or law enforcement investigations” (NICCS, 2016). DF as a field of cyber 
investigation branch is a diverse and fast-paced. This has been a suitable ground for creating 
off-the-shelf courses from internationally known institutions like SANS, ENISA, CompIT, 
ISACA, (ISC)2 and Mile2 that provide lectures, materials, trainings, workshops and give 
out internationally accepted certifications. Most of these courses take place in the United 
States and United Kingdom however there are courses which take place in Europe. Com-
monly for the international training audience, are virtual classrooms which are led by online 
instructors in pre-recorded videos or video teleconferencing (VTC). As these companies 
have been accredited by National Security Agency (NSA), Committee on National Security 
Systems (CNSS), NICCS, mapped with National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) cyber security workforce framework and also known to be preferred by FBI’s (Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation) Tier 1-31 trainings and in the United States Navy, Army, Air 
Force and law enforcement ranks. Highly ranked and wanted certifications means that they 
have acquired hefty price tags, for example 5 day Certified Digital Forensics Examiner Cer-
tification Course price range is 4,000.00 euros and some courses price tag reaching over 
6,000.00 euros (Mile2, 2018). Nevertheless these aren’t overall educational strategies. 
Due to the Estonia’s high level of development in the field of information technology we 
have made our infrastructure and high-tech lifestyle a potential platform for cyber-attacks 
and –incidents, which has increased the need for experts in this fast-paced evolving branch. 
According to new 2018 Global Digital suite (Kemp, 2018) of reports, out of 1.31 Million 
people in Estonia approximately 97% (1.27 Million) Estonia’s population use the internet 
(see Figure 1), in which 88% use it every day, 10% at least once per week and 2% once per 
month (Kemp, 2018).  
 
Figure 1 A Snapshot of the Estonia’s key digital statistical indicators (Kemp, 2018) 
                                                 
1 “Approval of the Federal Investigative Standards,” signed by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) as 
the “Security Executive Agent” and the Acting Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) as the 
“Suitability Executive Agent.” - William Henderson / Jul 23, 2009 
97%
81%
55%
80%
46%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
A snapshot of the Estonia's key digital statistical indicators from total population of 1.31 Million
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It is safe to say that basically 97% (see Figure 2) of all of the adult population currently uses 
some kind of digital device in their everyday life, be it in e-commerce, managing diary or 
appointments, checking weather, taking photos or videos, reading book, etc. 
 
Figure 2 Device Usage in Estonia (Kemp, 2018) 
 The rapid development of information technology and the high number of smart devices, 
overall Internet of Things (IoT) and other portable “wearable” electronics leave digital 
traces that can be linked to suspicious acts. These traces most certainly include location 
information which in most investigations are key evidences. Formulating these electronic 
evidence (e-evidence2 hence forward digital evidence) into presentable form do be decent 
and understandable enough for both leading investigators and stakeholders to carry out in-
cident and crime investigations and present findings to court of law or other parties. For 
instances Estonian Academy of Security Sciences does not provide gathering and handling 
digital evidences courses for Police Officer, Police Service and Internal Security curricu-
lums (EASS, 2018) which are in the forefront in collecting and processing digital evidences. 
That’s why the need for to development of DF workforce competency based model for re-
taining and training purposes. This DF workforce development roadmap has to be both di-
verse and agile as technologies and devices that are being examined (Kiper, 2017).  
This Master's thesis focuses on combining this understanding and offers an in-depth com-
petency based training and evaluation plan structure that is suitable for EDL CDU Digital 
Evidence Group. The main research question is "How to create an effective Digital Forensic 
workforce’s competency based (competency structure) development and retainment model 
for the EDL CDU’s staff?" 
 
                                                 
2 “Electronic evidence is data stored in electronic form – such as IP addresses, e-mails, photographs, or user 
names – that is relevant in criminal proceedings. Often, this data is stored by service providers, and law en-
forcement and judicial authorities have to turn to them to obtain it” (Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: 
Building strong cybersecurity for the EU, 2017). 
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1.1 Research Questions 
To get better overview we have created research questions which have been divided between 
chapters. The thesis main research question (MRQ) is: 
MRQ – How to create an effective Digital Forensic workforce’s competency based 
(competency structure) development and retainment model for the EDL CDU’s staff? 
This question is broken down into several sub-research-questions (SRQ): 
SRQ1 – What is the current emphasis and constraints of Digital Forensic workforce 
development and training within the ranks of EDL CDU? We will investigate the exist-
ing EDL CDU training program and decide which properties need to be considered for fur-
ther development. Information will be gathered and modeled using GAP analyses and mini-
Delphi method. 
SRQ2 – How to develop and retain DF workforce competency in EDL CDU? We will 
introduce DF workforce competency model, revised DF standard taxonomy (see Annex 
Digital Forensic ontology on the example of EDL CDU) with additions to sub-disci-
plines (new sub-discipline into DF taxonomy) and proposal for new structural layout for 
EDL CDU. 
SRQ3 – What are the means of validating the workforce competency development 
model? We will give the reader an overview of the evaluation procedures of the proposed 
model and remarks given by the leading experts and partner organizations on the DF field 
of work. 
1.2 Research Method 
The following research method is applied to provide a sufficient and detailed answer to the 
main research question (see MRQ in Section Research Questions): 
1. State of the art – Investigate and research the existing frameworks and courses avail-
able based on the set of knowledge and skills acquired by DF expert. 
By looking into different comparisons of Cyber Security based curricular frameworks we 
decided to continue with selected NICE framework. The decision was based on the frame-
works focus on genres and topics – which framework was evenly distributed and if possible 
focused on DF field, after which we started to map different courses provided by national 
and international schools/trainers. As the problem statement was introduced to EDL CDU 
Digital Evidence Handing Group board and discussed with both NCIRC TC and EDF CIRC 
representatives, it was clear that the need for such a mapping and workforce development 
tool was justified. We saw, that the state of art had to include binding standards and re-
strictions of DF, both national and international cases although main focus should be in 
domestic use. 
2. Analyze – Analyze the topics provided by the different courses and map the coherence 
of teachable topics and knowledge and skills mostly used/needed. We analyzed cur-
rent EDL CDU workforce training and development plan and compared it to NICE 
framework and work out a proposal for sustainable model. 
In the analysis, we monitored the coherence of training courses offered by training/educa-
tion institutions with the most common ones and most needed. When mapping, we looked 
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at the topics of the different course providers, and we presented the mapping results to spe-
cialists in the field of DF.  
3. Contribution – Propose DF competency based evaluation and training model to be 
used in the domain of DF. To provide qualitative skill and knowledge baseline through 
competency-based learning, developed for DF specialist education. Show how refer-
ence plan covers different Digital Forensic sub-disciplines and in sidelines, proposing 
NICE supportive structure model for the EDL CDU (Chapter Proposal for new EDL 
CDU specialization structure layout). 
The full extent of the contribution is not only focusing on the competency framework how-
ever in the process of mapping the standards that are shaping todays DF field, we saw the 
opportunity to give our proposals for revised DF standard taxonomies and suggest them 
being taken into use for EDL CDU and other establishments as well. The main purpose of 
these proposals is to standardize DF workforce training opportunities and increase the reli-
ability and efficiency of specialists handling digital evidence. 
4. Validation – Assessment of the proposed workforce competency training and devel-
opment model, while defining the full competencies spectrum of the DF field.  
The aim of this research is to determine, on the basis of the sources and experts opinions, 
which boundaries and skills must be determined and what capacity should be given to or-
ganization such as the EDL CDU. To highlight the roles that DF units have to fulfill and 
eventually provide a Digital Evidence group with a training and management model that 
would ensure units integrity and reliability in incident management and investigations. The 
feedback and reviews were focusing on the mini-Delphi method, single round surveys and 
the feedback was given both by interviews and in written forms and answers represented to 
research questions are the conclusive reviews of the evaluators. This technique has been 
adapted for use in face-to-face meetings, and is then called mini-Delphi or Estimate-Talk-
Estimate (ETE) Delphi.  It differs from the classical Delphi method by the level of rounds 
of feedbacks and timeframe, as the normal time for tests in classical Delphi method is 30 
years, in which period tests are repeated after every 5 years (Crisp, Pelletier, Duffield, 
Adams, & Nagy, 1997). The reason why we turned for Delphi method was its flexibility, as 
noted in “The Delphi Method for Graduate Research” by Skulmoski, Hartman and Krahn.  
It is a method for structuring a group communication process to facilitate group prob-
lem solving and to structure models (Linstone & Turloff, 1975). The method can also 
be used as a judgment, decision-aiding or forecasting tool (Rowe & Wright, 1999), 
and can be applied to program planning and administration (Delbeq, Van de Ven, & 
Gustafson, 1975). The Delphi method can be used when there is incomplete knowledge 
about a problem or phenomena (Adler & Ziglio, 1996; Delbeq et al., 1975). The 
method can be applied to problems that do not lend themselves to precise analytical 
techniques but rather could benefit from the subjective judgments of individuals on a 
collective basis (Adler & Ziglio, 1996) and to focus their collective human intelligence 
on the problem at hand (Linstone & Turloff, 1975). Also, the Delphi is used to inves-
tigate what does not yet exist (Czinkota & Ronkainen, 1997; Halal, Kull, & Leffmann, 
1997; Skulmoski & Hartman 2002). (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007) 
The questions and model were distributed to chosen experts. These experts were chosen 
both Estonia (e.g. Estonian Police Service, Estonian Forensic Science Institute and other 
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organizations3 in Estonia, as well as to private companies and abroad (e.g. NCIRC TC, Can-
ada Armed Forces, USA West Point Military Academy and Naval Academy) and they were 
given key evaluation questions as well given the opportunity to give their own proposal 
ideas which are also being taken into account and are being presented in this thesis as con-
clusive remarks. 
Furthermore we would like to provide input for future curriculums and training plans to 
create and enhance not only EDL CDU but entire DF community e.g. Estonia Police Service 
specialists or any specialists working in the DF expertise field. 
In the next chapter (Chapter 2) we shall give overview of a state of art and setting the stand-
ards for DF. This is followed by constraints regarding DF and evidence handling. Chapter 
3 describes the contribution – analysing and mapping the EDL CDU Forensic Groups skill-
set, improve unit’s recruitment criteria and help to develop DF competency model. Followed 
by a proposal for DF group competency model to expert level with the restrictions in mind 
which have been provided by EDL CDU. Chapter 4 present assessment and validation of 
proposed workforce competency model and ultimately applying it to EDL CDU Digital Ev-
idence group training. Finally, chapter 5 gives the concluding remarks and presents future 
works. In the appendix the reader will find proposal for a new structural model for EDL 
CDU, overview of standards regulating DF field, suggested instructional strategies for dig-
ital forensics use with each level of revised Bloom's taxonomy, suggested courses and cur-
riculums, proposal for new DF discipline (unmanned systems forensics) and lastly DF 
model framework table (see Annex Proposal for Digital Forensic Competency Model 
Framework based DOL Competency Model). 
Disclaimer:  
 The views and opinions expressed in this thesis are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any agency named in this thesis. 
Proposals within this thesis are focused mainly for EDL CDU use, however can be 
utilized in other agencies as well, if organization or agency personnel management 
approves it.  
 Some names and identifying details have been changed or left out to protect the 
anonymity of individuals or the agencies/organizations. 
                                                 
3 The complete list of institutions and persons shall not be made public due to the requirement to remain 
anonymous. 
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2 State of the Art 
This chapter introduces the state of art for DF educational development and provide an an-
swer to “What is the current emphasis and constraints of DF workforce development and 
training within the ranks of EDL CDU? (SRQ1 in Section 1.1). To better answer this ques-
tion, we break it down into four sub-questions:  
1) Which standards are shaping the DF? 
2) What are considered properties and emphasis for DF experts in Estonia? 
3) What are the DF constraints in the legal space in Estonia? 
We will begin by giving overview of the general requirements for DF experts and detailed 
insight to the characteristics and emphasis shaping the DF educational development. After 
this, subfields of DF are being looked into detail. Followed by overview of legal constraints 
regarding the digital evidence handling. 
2.1 Background 
The EDL according to Colonel Lieutenant Viktor Kalnitski, chief of Viru District, said that 
the EDL is a voluntary organization intended to contribute to Estonian national defence by 
supporting national institutions and structures on the basis of a wide broad approach to de-
fence. The Estonian Defence Force’s(EDF), the Police and Border Guard Board(PBGB), 
the Rescue Board and local governments are the main cooperation partners of the EDL. 
Although there is a willingness to help other national structures: hospitals, schools, etc. 
(Lamus-Tšistotin, 2018). In 03.07.2014 the Republic of Estonia established Regulation No. 
108 (Conditions and procedure for involvement of the Defence League in ensuring cyber 
security, 2014), which regulates the conditions and procedure of the involvement of the EDL 
in ensuring Cyber Security. Thus the EDL Cyber Unit can be brought in by the Information 
System Authority(RIA) or by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) or the authorities of its area 
of government within the scope of either of their tasks. Since the unit is made up of volun-
teers with diverse backgrounds of knowledge and skills behind them, they still need ongoing 
training and deployment in the exercises and on-the-job training. In order to be at the re-
quired level, trainings and curricula of the leading certification centers must be taken as the 
benchmark, and a suitable workforce competency development model must be developed. 
As there are no right or wrong teaching methods for achieving these goals, we have to look 
at the scope of DF educational possibilities that are given. With such variety of International 
courses and complexity of retaining the feedback of how effective the course was and how 
did the student perform. Assessment cannot be done as “black-and-white” – did the special-
ist acquire the evidence needed or not, furthermore how did they acquire it and are these 
still applicable in court of law. We have decided to use European Union Agency for Network 
and Information Security (ENISA), Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies (SANS), The 
Computing Technology Industry Association (CompTIA), Mile2, Tallinn University of 
Technology (TalTech) and University of Tartu (UT), Estonian Academy of Security Sci-
ences (EASS), NATO Cooperation Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) and 
many other curriculums, course materials and research papers (overview of courses sug-
gested are listed in appendix VII). This chapter will be also covering the boundaries and 
constraints that are set for EDL CDU in providing digital evidence, regarding evidence col-
lection and to be regarded as applicable in the investigations.  
Recent study on forensication education done by J. Richard Kiper’s “Forensication Educa-
tion: Towards a Digital Forensics Instructional Framework” identified “the most effective 
instructional design features for a future entry-level DF course” (Kiper, 2017). The product 
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of this effort was the Digital Forensics Framework for Instruction Design, a comprehensive 
DF instructional framework meant to guide the development of future DF. Second most 
recent framework which was revised in August 2017 was National Initiative for Cyber se-
curity Education (NICE) the Cyber security Workforce Framework. The last document 
serves as a fundamental reference resource for describing and sharing information about 
cyber security work and the knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA-s) needed to complete 
tasks that can strengthen the cyber security posture of an organization – purpose of this 
framework is to improve communication about how to identify, recruit, develop, and retain 
cyber security talents (Newhouse, Keith, Scribner, & Witte, 2017). Lastly we have taken the 
ontological model approach from five layer hierarchical structure specifying areas for cer-
tifying and specializing (Brinson, Robinson, & Rogers, 2006). By cultivating these three 
and comparing outcomes with revised Bloom’s Taxonomy the end result will be put in use 
by EDL CDU by whom the research was ordered. The demarcation of this chapter will be 
the Standard 008.0 Digital Forensics (008.1- 008.6) version 1.1 written by the Netherlands 
Register of Court Experts (Nederlands Register Gerechtelijk Deskundigen, NRGD) and 
Register of Court Experts in Criminal Cases Decree (NRGD, 2018). 
2.2 Research Protocol 
In this research protocol we will present which properties of the curricular frameworks we 
consider for our research. What were the used methods of implementation and what were 
the constraints in our research. 
2.2.1 Considered properties 
The research is done from a cyber security workforce training and education perspective 
and thus we are considering the following properties: 
1) Competency framework – we are implementing a modified United States of America 
Department of Labor (DOL) Competency Model Framework (developed by Em-
ployment and Training Administration) in the DF workforce perspective and we are 
layering it with the hierarchical structure from an ontological model. We suggest 
that these implementations should be included in DF curricular framework by intro-
ducing development plan for the future DF workforce. This whole proposal has been 
made with a direct focus in mind – to propose competency development model for 
EDL CDU Digital Evidence Group. 
2) Knowledge areas – we are mapping and emphasizing topics of the frameworks that 
are being handled and identifying areas of focus. 
3) Skills – we want to know which skills are needed and in which level should be de-
veloped and retained to support the workforce development model. 
4) Services – we are listing a number of services (e.g. different vendors, universities 
and organizations) which provide different levels of training and education, support-
ing the DF workforce development model.  
5) Standards – we are mapping the underlying standards that are shaping the DF com-
munity.  
2.2.2 Scope 
The scope of this thesis includes selected platforms of study and considered properties 
(skills, knowledge and abilities) for EDL CDU members. One of the main tasks of the EDL 
CDU is to share the knowledge and establish supportive capacities for crisis situations, thus 
the EDL CDU considers its mission to share their competence and knowledge in the area of 
information security. Members are not required to possess technical knowledge and skills 
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although it is beneficial to have basic knowledge in IT, because they will be given the chance 
to participate in different courses to acquire necessary the skillset. Although the EDL CDU 
uses four shared knowledge principals (transfer, exchange, collectivism and distribution of 
knowledge) the correct workforce development or training plan has not yet been drawn up, 
making it a problem for developing DF workforce inside the ranks. Similar problem was 
noted in the ranks of NATO Computer Incident Response Capability – Technical Center 
(NCIRC TC)4. PBGB also is facing the same problem with their investigators, who come 
across digital evidence on a daily basis, hence the need to map the roles and skills for DF 
specialists, first responders and other roles to start developing an organization wide work-
force development plan. 
It has to be mentioned that PBGB investigators go through EASS official curriculum, which 
is financed nationally. On the contrary, however the budget for EDL CDU training is 
smaller, than for EDF and PBGB counterparts, so the workforce training and educating has 
been done largely through self-study basis. The current principals for developing EDL CDU 
course materials have so far been done by taking into account the guidance materials for the 
development of the curriculum issued by the Archimedes Foundation. The current practice 
is to share knowledge principals, one member at the time. A unit’s member learns a partic-
ular skill and then on a common study day it will be shared with others (Põldmaa, 2018). 
Although it may work to some degree, it is still necessary to draw up a list of roles for the 
EDL CDU and descriptions of the skills for each role. For example, the core knowledge for 
a DF specialist should be to know what to do upon first arriving on the site – initial opera-
tions at the incident site. This will be mainly focused for first responders, crime scene in-
vestigators, evidence collectors as the fundamental skill that everyone should know or be 
familiar with. Occupational competencies are technical and specific skills that shall be fo-
cused on more complicated skillsets, e.g. cloning HDD image, getting a memory dump, 
Android, iOS, Linux, Win forensics skills, - Administrating Windows and Linux based sys-
tems (command line). 
2.2.3 Limitations 
Today Estonia has taken the position in the forefront of digital and cyber space by applying 
e-Governance, Government Cloud, I-voting, State e-Services Portal and e-Cabinet and thus 
making them top of the digital society. On the other hand making them vastly dependant on 
different communication systems, IoT, smart devices and other forms of digital communi-
cation, meaning that every resident in Estonia and now after e-Residency almost everyone 
around the world will be leaving their mark in cyber space and therefore possibly creating 
digital evidence. These evidence materials have characteristics like being hidden, not con-
strained by national borders and jurisdiction, easily tampered and destroyed and sensitive to 
time factors. Similarly to physical evidence, the digital evidence is being used in any type 
of court, be it administrative cases, criminal proceedings or even civil matters. Thus the 
curricular frameworks and competency model should be reviewed and modified accordingly 
for the purpose of EDL CDU being called upon according to Code of Criminal Procedure 
(KrMS) § 1091 as a qualified person. This states that a natural person or in this case specialist 
may be involved in procedural acts if he or she has specific expertise which is being needed. 
Many curricular frameworks are being developed and we will be focusing mostly on the use 
of digital evidence in a Criminal proceedings’ context.  
                                                 
4 By the time that this thesis will be published, the Agency would have made significant progress in develop-
ment of Talent Management program within its own structures. Changes that were made will not be reflected 
here. 
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2.3 Digital Forensics 
In this section we will introduce standards that are shaping the DF community and ultimately 
answering the SRQ1 sub-questions: 
1) Which standards are shaping the DF? 
2) What are considered properties and emphasis for DF experts in Estonia? 
3) What are the DF constraints in the legal space in Estonia? 
We will begin by giving overview of the general standards for the DF community to get an 
insight to the characteristics and emphasis shaping the DF field. 
2.3.1 Standards shaping the digital forensics community 
On the 1st of January 2010 “Experts in Criminal Cases Act” was put to place in the Nether-
lands. Its sole purpose was to set legal requirements for the quality, reliability and compe-
tence of the experts (Henseler & Loenhout, 2018). In response to this the NRGD held a 
survey in 2014 amongst leading forensics and justice system experts (NRGD, 2018). The 
goal was to determine the need to acknowledge DF as a new field of expertise and to create 
standards for this particular field (Henseler & Loenhout, 2018). The result of this survey 
strongly suggested that the registration of new standards for the DF’s field in the same year 
was needed. The standard’s version 1.0 was fully codified in June 2015 as the 8th field: 
1) DNA-analyses and interpretation;  
2) Handwriting Examination;  
3) Forensic Psychology;  
4) Forensic Toxicology;  
5) Drugs-analyses and interpretation;  
6) Weapons and Ammunition; 
7) Forensic Pathology; 
8) Digital Forensics (Newly adapted). 
This standard is now the basis of assessment for DF experts. The assessment is done by the 
Advisory Committee for Assessment (ACA) Board which consist of international experts 
(e.g. Germany, Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom and South Africa) on the basis of this 
standard (Henseler & Loenhout, 2018). In 2014 and 2015 the project “Towards European 
Forensic Standardization through Best Practice Manuals (TEFSBPM)” was coordinated by 
the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI). The result was the 10 best 
practice manuals (BPM) one of which was “Forensic Examination of Digital Technology” 
(ENFSI, 2015). The need for BPMs was supported by the Prevention of and Fight against 
Crime Program of the European Commission (Security and Safeguarding Liberties - 
Prevention of and Fight against Crime, 2013). The concept of this was that the BPM’s will 
enhance the quality of forensic services across the Europe and by doing so, encourage fo-
rensic standardization and cross-border cooperation (ENFSI, 2015). Cross-border coopera-
tion has been in recent talks in the European Parliament and the Council for building 
stronger cyber security for the EU (Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong 
cybersecurity for the EU, 2017). Due to the complexity of DF being an expertise, the Advi-
sory Committee of Standards (ACS) and the NRGD distinguishes in their standard the fol-
lowing subfields within the field of DF, as it also will be implemented it in our proposal. 
The expert must stipulate the subfield or fields from at least on one category (see Figure 3) 
(NRGD, 2018).  
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Figure 3 DF subfields (NRGD, 2018)  
On the 24th of May 2018 version 1.1 was approved and took effect on the 5th of June 2018, 
its overall purpose being to ensure the confidence in the forensic expertise for stakeholders5 
(NRGD, 2018). 
The development of international standards is important to enhance the reliability, transpar-
ency and confidence in collecting and handling evidence. These standards harmonize work 
practices between agencies and countries in response to cross border investigations. In case 
of losing or exhausting ones capabilities the support asked can be answered with services 
which fit to the purpose by the already adapted standards. As stated before by the NRGD, 
DF is a discipline of forensic sciences and therefore to be reviewed under ISO 21043, ISO 
17025, BS 10008 and ISO 27K series, which promotes capturing forensics and investigation 
of evidence and digital evidence (International Organization for Standardization, 2018).  
The goal is to internationally adopt similar if not identical approaches, making it easier for 
experts all over the world to compare and evaluate investigation finds and also be looked 
over and understood by different experts on other fields of expertise (International 
Organization for Standardization, 2018). These standards are not adopted by all local laws, 
however they provide detailed guidance on digital evidence. Overview of these standards is 
brought out in Annex Overview of standards regulating Digital Forensic community.  
2.3.2 Basics of Digital Forensics 
The core activities which each expert of any field of expertise must do is to first collect the 
evidence, secondly examine the evidence and thirdly do the analyses and write a detailed 
report. In DF the key procedural activities are all the same. In the first phase correct 
measures must be taken to validly copy and preserve digital footprints from media devices 
(e.g. hard drives, random-access memory, etc.). DF expertise in digital material must cover 
all aspects of digital systems, data entry, export, and processing. Digital information, the so-
called digital fingerprint is found on an increasing number of sources such as hardware, 
software, or a combination of both. In the case of an investigation in a court, an expert must 
be prepared to answer questions and prove his/her competence in this area and, if necessary, 
justify how he performed his activities and what gives him the certainty that this certificate 
has not been tampered with. Every expert should be able to carry out all three core activities 
(Henseler & Loenhout, 2018). 
Data Collection – involves the proceeding of correct methods used for copying, recording 
and preserving digital materials, thus expertise of various collection methods and software 
solutions for acquiring the evidence. Equal importance is knowledge of different systems 
and devices (tablets, smartphones, etc.), where to look for certain type of information. Alt-
hough before we can start collecting data from the digital material, we have to recover the 
                                                 
5 All stakeholders in the criminal justice system are involved in the development of quality improvement of 
expert opinions: the forensic expert and professional organisation, the Public Prosecution Service, judges, 
defence lawyers, the NRGD, the legislator and the European Commission. All are involved in drawing up 
quality frameworks for expert opinions. NRGD is only a part of this process (NRGD, 2018). 
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digital evidence from the actual scene and handle it accordingly. So it is in the vital interest 
of the investigation that the First Responder (e.g. police officer, evidence collection team, 
investigator), individuals or teams that in the early stages of an incident are responsible for 
protecting and preserving the crime scene, property, evidence, and the environment as intact 
and uncontaminated as possible and securing and documenting all the findings. This means 
that physical collection is equally important as data collection from these sources. In our 
case due to lack of manpower collecting may be the role of the EDL CDU forensics team 
members. Proper collecting can be managed only via correct and disciplined training and 
experience in evidence collection and preservation – crime scene management. This stage 
may be the most important and difficult, because if the evidence is tampered with during 
collecting, finds might end up being removed from the evidence list, thus making the spe-
cialists’ skills questionable. This is where extra care and training comes into play. The train-
ing done for the experts should prepare them to be ready to answer questions relevant to the 
investigation, which will vary according to the stages of evidence handling (NRGD, 2018).  
“The following questions - amongst others - are relevant for the data collection 
phase within the Digital Forensics field of expertise: 
1. Is the electronic equipment correctly secured? 
2. Is the bypassing of the access code correctly carried out? 
3. Is the data correctly safeguarded out of complex infrastructures like industrial 
control systems?” (NRGD, 2018). 
As collecting is done out there is a correct way of preserving the chain of custody and chain 
of events leading to the incident and chain of events leading to the discovery of a key proof 
for the case that would lead to a conviction and to patching up vital security flaws. To make 
sure that there will be no allegations of evidence being tampered with, the specialist would 
need to create an MD56 hash of the evidence. The MD5 hash can then be used to compare 
a hash of the original data to the copy. The hash values provide a unique digital fingerprint, 
which has now been accepted as an example in the Federal Rules of Evidence as a practical 
means of digital evidence validation. Previously there was the need to call in qualified wit-
nesses and specialists who would have to authenticate ESI, however new FRE Rule 902 
makes authentication easier for litigators (Michigan Legal Publishing Ltd., 2017). 
“(13) Certified Records Generated by an Electronic Process or System. A record 
generated by an electronic process or system that produces an accurate result, as 
shown by a certification of a qualified person that complies with the certification 
requirements of Rule 902(11) or (12). The proponent must also meet the notice re-
quirements of Rule 902(11). 
(14) Certified Data Copied from an Electronic Device, Storage Medium, or File. 
Data copied from an electronic device, storage medium, or file, if authenticated by 
a process of digital identification, as shown by a certification of a qualified person 
that complies with the certification requirements of Rule 902(11) or (12). The pro-
ponent also must meet the notice requirements of Rule 902(11)” (Michigan Legal 
Publishing Ltd., 2017). 
Data Examination – involves the investigation, tracing, filtering and evaluation of gathered 
and extracted hidden evidence without interpreting the resultant findings in the context of 
the case (NRGD, 2018). Thus, a specialist can create his own experiment in which he intends 
                                                 
6 message digest 5, is a simple algorithm to implement, and provides a digital „fingerprint“ (Rollins, 2018) 
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to prove which evidence is relevant to this investigation and is eligible in court and ready 
for further analyses. In this phase the expert will come across volatile evidence, meaning 
the evidence needs constant power supply for storage. Often digital devices contain infor-
mation crucial to investigation in the internal memory. It is therefore vital that such devices 
are charged or kept behind a power source, until the expert has recovered the required in-
formation. The volatile data that could be lost upon removal of a device from the power 
source could have key importance in court cases, that’s why it should not be discounted as 
non-important or non-relevant as it often can be a crucial argument in testimonies (Data 
Recovery Services Ltd, 2018). 
“The following questions - amongst others - are relevant for the data examination 
phase within the Digital Forensics field of expertise: 
1. What data concerning the crime can be found on what exhibit, what is the location 
of the data and by what means can it be retrieved? 
2. Was the data accessible by use of software available to the suspect? 
3. Can it be ascertained when the retrieved data has been stored on the data carrier 
when the data has been accessed, modified and/or changed? 
4. In case of deleted information like text messages, photos and videos, has such 
information been correctly retrieved? 
5. Is the exchange of data, captured in a network trace, correctly made visible?” 
(NRGD, 2018). 
Data Analysing – this involves cleaning, remodeling, inspecting and discovering useful in-
formation and interpreting them as the evidence which was gathered from digital resources. 
Analysing should be done on a duplicate copy of the evidence, so that the original would 
not be tampered with. The experts aim is to give professional review and assessment in 
which he or she will have to support the decision-making in court hearings (NRGD, 2018). 
“Questions relating to reconstruction 
1.a. Is digital evidence present on the material to be examined? 
1.b. What is the nature of the digital evidence on the material to be examined? 
1.c. How did the digital evidence end up on the material to be examined? 
These questions are aimed at providing a reliable reconstruction of how digital evi-
dence ended up on the material to be examined. After all, digital evidence can be 
produced in various ways. 
Questions relating to interpretation 
2.a. Does the read data match a scenario outlined in advance? 
2.b. Given alternative hypotheses, what can you say about the evidence that was 
found? 
2.c. Given the evidence that was found, what can you say about the alternative hy-
potheses? 
Questions aimed at providing a qualitative opinion 
3.a. How much knowledge and skill in the field of digital technology is required in 
order to achieve a particular result? 
3.b. Is a particular event or action technically difficult?” (NRGD, 2018). 
These questions give a relatively good overview of what a DF specialist is up against in case 
of being involved in the investigations. We suggest that these questions should be included 
in training practices for DF specialists on each taken upon case. 
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2.3.3 Subdivision of Digital Forensics 
As stated before, due to the complexity of DF as expertise, we have taken NRGD Digital 
Forensic Standard 1.1 and detailed ontology for DF disciplines published in 2014 in Journal 
of forensic sciences to establish and assist the development of professional specialization. 
The detailed proposal with improved ontology for EDL CDU can be found later in the thesis. 
The DF is divided into 6 sub-units (Computer, Software, Database, Multimedia, Device and 
Network forensic) as previously presented in Figure 3. 
Computer forensics 
Computer forensics uses different methods for pertaining the evidence from desktops, lap-
tops and servers. Search will be carried out after the incident has been happened. Evidence 
is in most cases stored on the computers’ hard drive that also stores operating system’s data 
(e.g. log files) and application/user’s data (see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4 Computer Forensics subfields (NRGD, 2018) (Karie & Venter, 2014) 
The Random Access Memory (RAM) investigation and evidence collection must be done 
as soon as possible, considering of the value of data that may be lost by powering down a 
device (Karie & Venter, 2014). Collected data is emails, documents, deleted files as well as 
metadata - nformation about the files, like creation date, when was it last edited, saved or 
printed. 
Software forensics 
The goal of software forensics is to examine potential evidence inside a software code. Soft-
ware forensics covers operation systems, software applications, forensics’ tools and mal-
ware (see Figure 5). Software forensics (furthermore known as software forensics’ engi-
neering) can address other problems, like finding point of failure in software’s running crit-
ical infrastructure, which can have major effects in case of accidents or incidents7.  
As people have their own linguistic features so does the company or programmer who pro-
duces the source code or the architectural design of the software. The code can reflect the 
so-called generation (by showing the complexity and how and when it was devised) and 
type or form (functionality). This said the source code can be viewed in forensic viewpoint 
as well as its counter part, hand writing. This branch primarily focuses on the concerns of 
discovering potential evidence from a binary code8 of the software or application, further-
more it is used to test the DF tools. This is for legitimacy purposes, so that the instruments 
that are being used to retrieve evidence, are valid. The four methods that are being used for 
source code analyses for determining authorship are Author Discrimination, Identification, 
Characterization and Intent determination. 
                                                 
7 July 23 2012 train crash, with over 40 dead in Wnzhou China was caused by railway software failure. 
8 A code whose application results in a code element set whose elements are formed from an alphabetic *[ 
numeric ] *[ alphanumeric ] *[ binary] character set. (Institute of the Estonian Language, 2018) 
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Figure 5 Software Forensics subfields (NRGD, 2018) (Karie & Venter, 2014) 
Firstly the Author Identification method is being used for determining the author of a code 
or a piece of code, if the program was done by multiple authors. In this method it is necessary 
to have samples from said authors previous works to compare the codes. Secondly the Au-
thor Characterization method, which is further more known as profiling, is done by analys-
ing the author’s code for characteristics, such as education, personality, cultural and reli-
gious beliefs and background. And thirdly Author Intent Determination method, the purpose 
of which is to determine if software has errors or flaws, whether they have been written for 
intentional malice or a random error. 
Attacks against average digital device users and companies through computer fraud, vi-
ruses9, worms10, logic bombs11, trojan horses12, plagiarism, patent infringements and other 
intellectual property theft are still active. In 2017 two cases, Cisco v. Arista13 (Cisco Sys-
tems Inc. accused Arista Networks Inc. for allegedly copying the command line interfaces 
of Cisco software used to manage ethernet switches) and Zenimax v. Oculus14(Facebook 
subsidiary Oculus VR Inc. was accused of copying the software architecture of a virtual 
reality video game publisher ZeniMax Media Inc.), are good examples of court cases where 
software forensics was put in use.  
Database forensics 
Servers store massive amounts of sensitive data. Database forensics look at who accessed 
the database and what actions were performed. Although the figures have been decreasing 
                                                 
9 A program that propagates itself by modifying other programs to include a possibly changed copy of itself 
and that is executed when the infected program is invoked. (Institute of the Estonian Language, 2018) 
10 A self-contained program that can propagate itself through data processing systems or computer networks. 
(Institute of the Estonian Language, 2018) 
11 Malicious logic that causes damage to a data processing system when triggered by some specific system 
condition. (Institute of the Estonian Language, 2018) 
12 An apparently harmless program containing malicious logic that allows the unauthorized collection, falsifi-
cation, or destruction of data. (Institute of the Estonian Language, 2018) 
13 Cisco v. Arista, Case No. 5:14-cv-5344-BLF (N.D. Cal. NC) 
14 Zenimax v. Oculus, Case No. 3:16-mc-00098 (N.D. Tex.) 
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year-by-year, almost 1.4 billion records were exposed in 686 breaches during the first quar-
ter of 2018 which is a big improvement compared to previous years 1442 incidents with 
over 3.4 billion records exposed. Database forensics is investigating unlawful disclosure, 
modification and/or thefts of data within a database to track down any perpetrators with such 
malicious intent (Karie & Venter, 2014). Specialists must search for motives and methods 
to try to identify suspects. Threat vectors differ from accidental exposes, outside attacks to 
inside malicious, last being the most likely vector of incident (Risk Placement Services, Inc., 
2018). 
“66.9% of incidents and 16.9% percent of exposed records are the result of outsider 
activity. It is worth noting that the threat vector for one incident exposing over 1 
billion records cannot be definitively classified, making the number of records at-
tributed to Unknown unusually high. The most likely vector for the incident is Inside-
Malicious” (Risk Placement Services, Inc., 2018). 
Forensic examination of database involves investigation of the timestamps (meta-data) to 
verify the actions of a database user (DBMS), transactions information (content) within a 
database system or application with specific time period in order to identify any fallacious 
transactions (see Figure 6) (NRGD, 2018). 
 
Figure 6 Database Forensics subfields (NRGD, 2018) 
Experts need to be informed in almost all aspects of database development and use. As they 
come across standard, out of the box, custom-built solutions that cannot be taken to office 
for analyses. 
Multimedia forensics 
Multimedia forensics is a perfect example of distrusting the idiom “seeing is believing”15. 
As we need concrete evidence, we cannot trust our eyes anymore because the photographic 
images, video and audio material have lost their innoscence. With the diffusion of digital 
media, the validity of photos as witness of a real events has now been lost. Multimedia 
forensics has to resolve the three categories fields in the DF tree (see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7 Multimedia Forensics subfields (NRGD, 2018) (Karie & Venter, 2014) 
                                                 
15 Only physical or concrete evidence is convincing, as in seeing is believing. This idiom was first recorded in 
this form in 1639. 
23 
Alteration of images, videos and audio recordings has been around since photography, film 
making and sound recording has existed. Retouching, cropping and compiling all these files 
can be done for many reasons, to improve the aesthetics, to carry out fraud or conceal traces 
and evidence. This form of investigation has become a fast changing and growing trend. 
Adoption of smart devices with high bandwidth, larger storage capabilities and a market 
with large number of new applications and programs which allows new methods of media 
manipulation, has provided the internet with vast amounts of multimedia content. It has 
become part of our everyday life and a basic human activity to record videos and take pic-
tures of our daily activities. As we have entered the era of digital lifestyle we are greeted 
with the rise of fake news in different forms. Social media, fake news sites, video-sharing 
and streaming sites are full of altered media, causing the visitor of these site to question 
themselves, what is real and what is not. Today anyone can obtain sophisticated technology 
which allows an inexperienced user to photoshop to a level in which it is nearly impossible 
to identify the counterfeited work. Multimedia forensics uses signal processing such as au-
dio, speech, image and video signal processing to identify the source and whether these 
recordings have been altered or manipulated. For instance in image forensics the image with 
the use of computer algorithms can show us a specific fingerprint of the device, which the 
picture was taken with. This fingerprint consist of such properties as systems color sensor, 
optical system type, etc. All commercially used cameras use metadata tags in their photos. 
This metadata information is rather simple to be acquired from the image. It allows to de-
termine the mark and model of the device, which was used to take the photograph and even 
the location where it was taken. However these tags can furthermore be manipulated, how-
ever signal processing allows other means to identify the digital acquisition of digital de-
vices (color sensor patterns, sensor imperfections (Dirik & Karakücük, 2014). 
Device forensics 
Every criminal investigation involves information that can be captured from a digital device, 
including phones and tablets. To understand what information can be obtained from these 
devices, as well as how to collect and preserve the information legally is critical. By under-
standing how wireless and cellular networks operate, and review data and information that 
can be obtained from these devices, we can build together a solid profile of the user and 
collect the necessary evidence if needed. Device forensics is divided into six major device 
groups - peripheral devices, network-enabled devices, storage devices, large-scale devices, 
small-scale devices, and obscure devices (see Figure 8) (NRGD, 2018) . 
Peripheral devices are system expanding devices that range from internal to external periph-
erals (mouse, keyboard, printer, CD-ROM). Network-enabled devices are network based 
telecommunication devices such as hubs, routers, wireless access points etc. Storage devices 
are basically any hardware that can store information (DVD, CD, RFID tags Micro SD 
cards). Large-scale devices are devices that deal with large (multiple terabyte-sized storage) 
data sets. Today the border between large scale and average storage device forensics gets 
distorted because new hard drives become cheaper and it is quite usual to find 2 terabyte 
hard drives in consumer computers. Small-scale devices are small and versatile handheld 
devices. The list of small-scale devices is yet to be finalized because of the development of 
even newer technologies in the age of IoT. Obscure devices are devices that cannot be clas-
sified under any of the other disciplines. Some examples of these are camcorders, surveil-
lance cameras (CCTV) and gaming devices (Karie & Venter, 2014). With now over 4 Bil-
lion users connected to the internet worldwide as of January 2018 (Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2018), which is well over half of the world’s population and nearly 6 times the 
devices, approximately 23.14 Billion devices are now online (Columbus, 2016) not to men-
tion offline devices. 
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Figure 8 Taxonomy of Device Forensics (NRGD, 2018) (Karie & Venter, 2014) 
Digital has become an essential part of our everyday life. We spend an average of 6 hours 
each day in internet however keep our devices connected and running 24/7. We are using 
connectivity in almost every aspect of our lives, chatting with friends, finding love on dating 
apps, playing games, searching product information, keep track of our health and movement 
habits via smart watches and streaming shows that were missed during being at work etc. 
For example in January 2018 year-on-year statistical overview showed 4% growth (+218 
Million) in unique mobile users world-wide, rising to 5.135 Billion unique mobile users. In 
Estonia the total population is approximately 1.31 Million and the annual digital growth has 
been since 1% January 2017 (+11 thousand users) bringing the total of 1.05 Million unique 
mobile device users (Kemp, 2018) . 
Network forensics 
Network forensics is a sub-discipline of DF relating to the monitoring and analyses of com-
puter network traffic for the purposes of information gathering, legal evidence, or intrusion 
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detection (NRGD, 2018). On network we deal with volatile and dynamic information, as 
traffic can be cut, making it often a pro-active investigation (Yan, 2017). The network traffic 
evidence might help even if host machine logs have been erased by the attacker, therefore 
be the only evidence available for forensic analyses (Hjelmvik). Captured network traffic is 
used for collecting transfered files and searching for keywords from captured communica-
tions, by capturing network data via "catch it as you can" and "stop - look - listen" method 
(Parate & Nirkhi, 2012). All this collection of information like tweets and user / device 
relationship generated info (log data containing text, images etc.) is called big data. To get 
the grasp of the shere size of big data, let’s try to visualize it, just consider the 2.38 billion 
people active on Facebook since March 31, 2019. Every 60 seconds on Facebook: 510,000 
comments are posted, 293,000 statuses are updated, and 136,000 photos making approxi-
mately 300 million photos uploaded every day (Noyes, 2019). These photographs alone 
comprise over 557.5 billion bits of information, which just microscopic in the world of big 
data (Jeffers, 2018). 
Network forensics is divided into Cloud, Telecom, Internet and Wireless network forensics 
(see Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9 Network Forensics subfields (NRGD, 2018) 
Cloud computing is reckoned to be the most radically changing and developing IT service. 
Telecom network forensics can be summed up basically as “phone tapping”, especially now 
with the widespread in voice-over-IP (VoIP) systems. In Estonia for example, last year 
4,596 calls were tapped from Telia Eesti. Although you need to go through a complex pro-
cess to obtain a court permit for this type of evidence collecting. Estonian government has 
information acquisition permit. This meaning that security agencies are additionally pursu-
ing our citizens, in fact, without any suspicion of crime, for the reasons of national security. 
The circumstances for this conduct are state secrets. Furthermore the total volume which 
this acquisition is taking place is considered as a state secret (Nääs, 2018) . Internet foren-
sics consist of commerce, business information, transactions etc. Internet shops are con-
stantly becoming victims to internet attacks, most notably fraud (e.g. credit card fraud) and 
identity theft. The goal here is to uncover origins, content, patterns and transmission paths, 
as well as browser history to extract information that might contain potential evidence. 
Wireless forensics on other hand tries to capture data which is being exchanged over the 
wireless network. Evidence here can correspond to plain data or even voice conversations 
(Karie & Venter, 2014). 
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2.3.4 General requirements and restrictions for forensics experts in Estonia 
The Forensics Examination Act was passed in Estonia on the 30th May 2001, the scope of 
which was to give a legal status for DF’ specialists and forensics’ institutions to be regarded 
as experts in criminal, civil, administrative and misdemeanor proceedings. They will be 
providing scientific expert opinions on the presented evidence materials. Forensics Exami-
nation Act Chapter 1 § 4 states that “an expert is a person who uses non-legal expertise in 
the forensics examination and legal expertise in cases provided by law” (Forensic 
Examination Act, 2002). The act further states that forensics’ expert can be an officially 
certified expert or any other person who has been appointed by bodies, who are conducting 
the proceedings. According to the Act (§ 6), forensics’ expert for the EFSI can be anyone 
who has filled the following criteria:  
1) Has to have active legal capacity; 
2) Has to be proficient in Estonian to the extent established by law or on the basis of 
an Act; 
3) Has acquired higher education required in his or her field of expertise in an insti-
tution of higher education of the Republic of Estonia or if the person's education 
corresponds to the said level; 
4) If the person has acquired a foreign professional qualification, they may be em-
ployed as forensics’ experts if their professional qualification is recognized by the 
Estonian Forensic Science Institute; 
5) Has been employed in his or her field of expertise in forensics’ or research institu-
tion or in another position for at least two years immediately prior to commencing 
employment as a forensics’ expert (Forensic Examination Act, 2002). 
Restrictive circumstances, that do not allow person to be forensics’ expert, are: 
1) Conviction of in intentionally committed criminal offence; 
2) Punished under misdemeanor procedure for a violation of the Anti-corruption Act; 
3) Has a close blood relationship (grandparent, parent, brother, sister, child or grand-
child) or a relationship by marriage (spouse, spouse's parent, brother, sister or 
child) with the employee who has direct control over the corresponding position or 
with the immediate superior; 
4) State of health prohibits him or her to work as a forensics’ expert. Medical com-
mittee shall determine the person’s state of health (Forensic Examination Act, 
2002). 
The restrictions provided in the second clauses under “1) and 2) of this section do not extend 
to persons whose punishment data has been expunged from the punishment register pursuant 
to the Punishment Register Act” (Forensic Examination Act, 2002). As of the EFSI, EDF, 
EDL, RIA and PBGB peronnel have to go through a rigorous background check which all 
have to give their consent for. Under the virtue of office, the likelihood for an expert to 
obtain the right to gain access to state secrets or to classified information of foreign states is 
very probable. This means that a clean background and reputation comes a long way. 
2.3.5 National legal constraints 
According to G. Raudsepp Estonian legislation has not implemented any regulation for dig-
ital evidence in specific, which means, the use of digital evidence is regulated by the general 
provisions found in KrMS (Raudsepp, 2018). Under the Prosecutor's Office Act (ProkS) § 
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1 prosecutor's office is a government agency within the Ministry of Justice which is involved 
in planning the surveillance necessary to detect and prevent criminal offences, conducting 
pre-trial criminal procedures and ensuring the legality and effectiveness, representing the 
state prosecution and performing other duties assigned to the prosecutor's office by law 
(Prosecutor's Office Act, 1998). Referring to the obligation resulting from mentioned law 
suggests to KrMS § 211 which states that the objective of a pre-trial procedures is to collect 
evidentiary information, create other conditions necessary for court procedures and ascer-
tain the facts and evidence vindicating or accusing the suspect or accused. The same act 
additionally inclines the Prosecutors office to involve supervising surveillance institutions 
and, if necessary, conducting procedural steps (Code of Criminal Procedure, 2004). G. 
Raudsepp stated, that there is no regulation in Estonia at the research institution level which 
focuses on specifically on digital evidence collection, investigation and the training DF 
workforce. (Raudsepp, 2018) 
According to EDF LEGAD the evidence hence digital evidence can be viewed under KrMS 
§ 124 to be any information or object which have been acknowledged by a competent in-
vestigation body. Problem which we noted is that under the KrMS § 31, the only competent 
investigative body in National Defence sector is military police (MP) (Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 2004). If MP conducts investigation which has digital evidence they don’t have 
any legal authority signed and the same goes for EDF CIRC, although these units have ca-
pabilities to conduct investigative procedures over digital evidence. In criminal proceedings, 
court evidence is available that is collected in accordance with the provisions of the KrMS. 
Evidence in a civil matter are described and provided in Part 5 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure act (TsMS), however there are no specific requirements for the form or collection of 
evidence. Evidence to use in administrative proceedings, including disciplinary proceed-
ings, is in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act (HMS). In principle, there is 
no distinction in civil procedure. Although a disciplinary procedure is called a disciplinary 
offense, the requirements of an administrative procedure, and not the requirements of a 
criminal procedure apply. International co-operation is governed by EU regulations (see 
chapter International legal constraints). Most stringent rules are of criminal procedures, alt-
hough in this case the proceedings (the investigator) the obligation to comply with the gath-
ering of evidence and the proper formatting rules. According to EDF legal advisor (LEGAD) 
there is no need to use any regulation to interact with the authorities (Lehtla, 2018). All the 
institutions under the same legislative power forming a single country, among which there 
are shared different competences for effective functioning, like the different limbs of a per-
son make up one body. One hand of man does not have to work with another hand to coop-
erate with one another to grab the object that is seen by the eyes. Currently, the legal service 
is in constant contact with the Estonian Internal Security Service (KAPO) in a criminal pro-
ceeding, and (Code of Criminal Procedure, 2004) responsible for issuing and formalizing 
evidence according to the investigator's inquiries. 
Digital evidence handling, if an entity (in this case EDL CDU) receives the right of an in-
vestigative body, criminal training courses must be completed, in which both theoretical and 
practical collection of evidence is to be completed. If the research institution does not have 
a status, then internal procedure should be used for handling digital evidence. If the investi-
gation touches upon state or foreign secrets, then guidelines for the protection of state secrets 
must be used. If the information has become evidence, in accordance with KrMS § 125 (3), 
the holder of the certificate ensures its inviolability and preservation. All processing require-
ments for specific information are valid. In the case of KrMS operations, competence must 
be monitored. For example, pursuit actions may only be carried out by an investigative body 
with the permission of the Prosecutor's Office or a preliminary investigating judge (KrMS 
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§ 1262 and of the EDF Organisation Act § 412). Administrative procedure is initiated on the 
initiative of the administrative body, then from the notification of the person about the pro-
cedure (KrMS § 35 (1) 2) of the HMS. Civil procedure is in equal relationship between the 
two parties. The specificity of the administrative procedure is that in the administrative re-
lationship the EDF is in the position of power and criminal proceeding is being stated as 
initiated by making the first procedural act (KrMS §193). It is possible to share one proce-
dure between different authorities. Depending on the type of procedure, the procedure for 
formalization must be followed. One type of procedure does not go beyond the second. The 
administrative procedure starts in isolation, the criminal proceedings begin in their own 
right, and the beginning of civil proceedings may furthermore be earlier than a written agree-
ment, perhaps already pre-contractual negotiations are civil relations, which may lead to 
rights and obligations (Lehtla, 2018). 
2.3.6 International legal constraints 
International legal constraints that deny or allow the acquisition of digital evidence are the 
same as for physical evidence. International agreements give the state the opportunity to 
fight crime in the best possible way. This meaning that its contractors additionally agree on 
effective cooperation mechanisms in the area of criminal justice that will allow fast delivery 
of the data they need. One of these mechanisms is the European Convention on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters. Under Article 1 the obligated parties shall provide each 
other with comprehensive mutual assistance in criminal matters in which the punishment 
falls within the competence of the judicial authorities of the requesting party at the time of 
application for assistance16. In addition, Estonia has transnational law cooperation agree-
ments are divided into two separate groups by nature. Firstly there are national legal coop-
eration agreements in criminal matters, i.e. Estonia and Finland, and Estonia and the United 
States. And secondly there are legal aid agreements. These regulate international communi-
cation (Estonia – Ukraine17, Estonia – Latvia and Lithuania18) in both criminal and civil law 
matters. (Luuk, 2017) 
Cyberspace is by nature very difficult to pinpoint. Expert who is conducting the investiga-
tion and acquiring evidence, ask himself, whether the data is in regional state, allies, neutral 
for foes territory. If it falls out of national borders, then international element in criminal 
proceedings steps in. The need for international instruments of cooperation are needed. In-
vestigation of cyber-attacks is not generally possible without international cooperation. 
Many countries have resolved the cross-border data retrieval issues differently. For exam-
ple, the United States, Belgium and Portugal have taken steps to give them power, which 
gives them the right to issue searches and investigation on cases where the physical location 
of the computer is unknown. Most notable example is Portugal, who has taken the liberty to 
look at data from servers in other territories. And then there are countries where this area of 
jurisdictional expertise has been not regulated at all, only with the general clause, so that 
criminal proceedings will be enforced in their own national territory. As legal practice has 
shown, the reliability of a digital evidence is harder to prove in court due to its nature. The 
material is often technical and the investigator, prosecutor and furthermore the court needs 
some help examining digital evidence. This brings us back to training and educating every 
instance of personnel who deal with digital evidence. 
                                                 
16 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters; RT II 1997, 7, 36 
17 Agreement between the Republic of Estonia and Ukraine on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil 
and Criminal Matters. - RT II 1995, 13, 63 
18 Agreement on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations between the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Lith-
uania and the Republic of Latvia. - RT II 1993, 6, 5 
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2.4 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter we specified the reviewed state of the art for DF educational development. 
This needs to provide an answer to research question “What is the current emphasis and 
constraints of DF workforce development and training within the ranks of EDL CDU? 
(SRQ1 in Section Research Questions). To answer this question, we broke it down into four 
sub-questions:  
What are considered properties and emphasis for DF experts in Estonia? – Author re-
viewed the Forensic Examination Act and confirmed DF expert or any other person who 
has been appointed by bodies conducting the investigation and proceedings can be officially 
certified. One of such bodies is EFSI, which have stated criterias that must be fulfilled to be 
a DF expert. The person has to have active legal capacity; has to be proficient in Estonian; 
has acquired higher education or professional qualification required in his or her field of 
expertise, which has to be recognized by the Estonian Forensic Science Institute; and finally 
has to be employed in his or her field of expertise in a forensics’ or research institution or 
in another position for at least two years immediately prior to commencing employment as 
a forensics’ expert (Forensic Examination Act, 2002). The emphasis on core principle ac-
tivities which each DF expert must know are Data Collection, Data Examination and Data 
Analyses.  
Which standards are shaping the DF? – DF as expertise has been dictated by the Nether-
lands Advisory Committee of Standards (ACS) and the NRGD that DF would be divided 
into 6 subfields (Computer Forensics, Software Forensics, Database Forensics, Multimedia 
Forensics, Device Forensics and Network Forensics). By the NRGD, the DF is a discipline 
of forensic sciences and therefore should be reviewed under ISO standards. Author has 
mapped a list of ISO standards which are connected to DF in some form (overview can be 
see Annex Overview of standards regulating Digital Forensic community).  
What are the DF constraints in the legal space in Estonia? – Mainly legal constraints 
can be divided into two sub-categories a) National and b) International constraints. Firstly, 
nationally the main working legal acts are Prosecutor's Office Act RT I 1998, 41, 625 and 
Code of Criminal Procedure (KrMS) RT I 2003, 27, 166, which states that objective of pre-
trial procedure is to collect evidentiary information can be done by competent investigative 
body, in which case problem arises in KrMS. Under KrMS act the only competent investi-
gative body in National Defence sector is Military Police. Although EDL CDU can be called 
upon according to Code of Criminal Procedure (KrMS) § 1091 as a qualified person in which 
case the specialist will be going through evaluation by the Prosecutor’s Office. 
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3 Contribution 
This chapter describes the contribution of this thesis and provides answers to the research 
question “How to develop and retain DF’s workforce competency in EDL CDU?” (SRQ2 
in Section Research Questions) and proposes a DF’s workforce competency model(see An-
nex Proposal for Digital Forensic Competency Model Framework based DOL Competency 
Model), revised DF standard taxonomy (see Annex Digital Forensic ontology on the 
example of EDL CDU) with additions to sub-disciplines (new sub-discipline into DF 
taxonomy, see Annex Proposal for new Digital Forensic discipline – Unmanned Systems) 
and proposal for new structural layout for EDL CDU(see Annex EDL CDU structure plan 
after NICE Framework implementation to Digital Evidence Handling Group structure and 
Annex EDL CDU structure plan after implemented NICE Framework Component relation-
ship). 
How to enhance DF’s education, training and workforce development in EDL CDU? The 
Institute of Information Security Professionals (IISP), the Joint Task Force on Cyber secu-
rity (JTF), the National Initiative for Cyber security Education (NICE) and the National 
Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) – are frameworks that agree on an overall set of topics within 
the cyber security field, but they differ on the emphasis of the topics (Hallett, Larson, & 
Rashid, 2018). By mapping topics and knowledge units onto the Cyber security Body of 
Knowledge (CyBOK) guide, the four previously mentioned frameworks showed that alt-
hough all four frameworks cover a range of social, technical and legal themes, they have 
different aims (Newhouse, Keith, Scribner, & Witte, 2017). For example the IISP Frame-
work aims to define what knowledge experts need to work in cyber security, whilst the 
NCSC framework offers academic degree pathways for cyber security and DF to already on 
the field experts via a Certified Master’s programs (NCSC, 2019). The NICE Framework 
aims to categorize and describe the tasks and skills needed to do cyber security, in our case 
DF jobs focusing on the training and competency progression which is making it the most 
suitable for EDL CDU workforce training and developing management. Although the JTF 
Curriculum is basically a combination of mixed curricular guidances for academic institu-
tions, it aims to lead a resource of comprehensive cyber security curricular content for global 
academic institutions seeking to develop a broad range of cyber security offerings at the 
postsecondary level (Hallett, Larson, & Rashid, 2018). We welcome the NIST program by 
adapting NICE mission of “coordinating with government, academic, and industry partners 
to build on existing successful programs to increase the number of skilled cyber security 
professionals helping to keep our nation secure” (NICCS, 2016). NICE is committed to cul-
tivating an integrated cyber security workforce that is globally competitive from hire to re-
tire and prepared to protect organization or a nation from existing and emerging cyber se-
curity challenges (Newhouse, Keith, Scribner, & Witte, 2017). 
3.1 Documenting the Current state of EDL CDU Digital Evidence Handling 
Group 
In this section we will give an overview of the EDL CDU and ultimately answering the 
SRQ1 sub-questions: 
1) How is the current EDL CDU shaped? 
Firstly, to understand the current situation, we contacted the EDL CDU Digital Evidence 
Handling Group’s chief of command – Hillar Põldmaa and to get an overview of the struc-
ture and level of training. The structural change of the EDL CDU took place in 2015, where 
the Tallinn 1-4 or "forensics" group was created. Since then there have been attempts to 
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work out its necessary level of knowledge, training plan and a recruitment policy though the 
results have not met the EDL CDU needs (Põldmaa, 2018). As the unit will be involved in 
ensuring the continuity of the information and communication technology infrastructure, in 
controlling and solving security incidents through active and passive measures, the skillset 
that the members must obtain may include security testing for information and communica-
tion technology solutions, monitoring and analysing digital information and analysing spy-
ware, malware and computer viruses (Conditions and procedure for involvement of the 
Defence League in ensuring cyber security, 2014). The EDL CDU may be used for exercise 
purposes and in actual investigation proceedings, but it consists of volunteers who also have 
to fulfil their roles in their daily jobs. Consequently, there is a need for a DF’s workforce 
competency development plan that supports continuous professional development and train-
ing in order to maintain the competence of professionals in finding and handling digital 
evidence, in order to support investigations and to provide valid evidence for the necessary 
partners. 
EDL CDU itself is a voluntary organization unit aimed to protect Estonian cyberspace. Their 
main mission is to protect Estonia’s information infrastructure and support broader national 
defence. By which EDL CDU has stated following objectives (The Estonian Defence 
League, 2018): 
1) Cooperation development among qualified volunteer IT specialists; 
2) Raising the level of cyber security for critical information infrastructure through 
the dissemination of knowledge and training; 
3) Creating a network which facilitates public private partnership and enhances pre-
paredness in operating during a crisis situation; 
4) Education and training in information security; 
5) Participation in international cyber security training events (The Estonian Defence 
League, 2018). 
The EDL CDU consists of patriotic individuals with IT skills and experienced specialists in 
key nationally critical cyber security positions and in other fields concerning cyber security 
(The Estonian Defence League, 2018). In time technology continues to advance and major-
ity of business and pleasure tends to move into cyber space, especially in Estonia as we have 
become world’s most pre-eminent e-state: 
“In just 20 years, Estonia has become one of the most wired and technologically 
advanced countries in the world – a true digital society. With internet access de-
clared a human right, some of the fastest broadband speeds in the world widely avail-
able all across the country, and digital public services embedded into the daily lives 
of individuals and organisations, the country is now commonly called e-Estonia” 
(Tambur, 2018). 
That would naturally lead to massive increase in cyber-crimes such as hacking into business 
and private networks, credit card thefts and as past years have showed in both frequency 
and severity – ransomware attacks. WannaCry, NotPetya and Locky which cost interna-
tional businesses billions – estimated damages were 325 million in 2015, 5 billion in 2017 
and predicament of 11.5 billion dollars in 2019 (Morgan, 2018). From 2015 to 2017 the 
increase was 15 times, in which did ransomware also reach Estonia (Pau, 2017). Thus we 
added a whole new category in Software Forensics taxonomy under the Malware subdivi-
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sion. The exponential growth of cyber-crimes leads to digital evidence in DF’s investiga-
tions and for specialists to change and adapt with those changes, both training and practice 
in mind. Forensic’ community has noted that in the coming years the “legal community must 
be prepared to deal with an increase of digital evidence in both volume and complexity” 
(Henseler & Loenhout, 2018). 
3.1.1 Principle of operation in EDL CDU  
Since the EDL CDU is involved in PBGB, RIA CERT, EDF and many others core roles, 
the functions of the members should be compared to ENISA CSIRT roles. Members of the 
team should be prepared to be regarded as expert witnesses or qualified personell in court 
hearings. CSIRT is known to have various abbreviations used for the same sort of teams (in 
Europe it is being used predominantly as the protected term CERT), furthermore known as:  
 CERT or CERT/CC (Computer Emergency Response Team / Coordination 
Center) 
 CSIRT (Computer Security Incident Response Team) 
 IRT (Incident Response Team) 
 CIRT (Computer Incident Response Team) 
 SERT (Security Emergency Response Team)  
As EDL CDU has been accepted in supporting these establishments, they must be able to 
fulfill their key functions, which are: 
1) Mitigating and preventing major incidents and helping to protect’ valuable assets of 
the organizations; 
2) to have a centralized coordination for IT security issues within the organization 
(Point of Contact); 
3) to have a centralized and specialized handling of and response to IT incidents; 
4) to have the expertise at hand to support and assist the users to quickly recover from 
security incidents; 
5) to help to deal with legal issues and preserving the evidence in the event of a lawsuit; 
6) to keep track of developments in the security field; 
7) stimulate cooperation within the constituency on IT security (Bronk, Thorbruegge, 
& Hakkaja, 2006). 
We are using CSIRT roles as a prerequisite for EDL CDU members and have composed a 
comparable table with skills, tasks and possible training options brought out for better in-
sight (Põldmaa, 2018). As mentioned before one of the main tasks of the EDL CDU is to 
share the knowledge and establish a supportive capacities for crisis situations, thus the EDL 
CDU considers its mission to share their competence and knowledge in the area of infor-
mation security. Their training principle is that the members are not required to possess 
technical knowledge and skills although it is beneficial to have a baseline of knowledge in 
IT. Digital Evidence Handling Group members will be given the chance to participate in 
different courses to acquire necessary competencies. Although the EDL CDU uses 4 shared 
knowledge principals (knowledge transfer, exchange, collectivism and distribution) the cor-
rect workforce development or training plan has not yet been drawn up, making it a signif-
icant problem for developing DF’s workforce inside the ranks. 
3.1.2 Principals of development on current EDL CDU role structure 
EDL CDU has been practicing member recruitment from the ranks EDF conscripts or from 
IT-based schools, universities or companies for years and they have developed the principle 
of development (see Figure 10), which by now is over 5 years old. As previously mentioned 
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the current training principle is based on shared knowledge principle basis (which we see 
should be continued even with using our proposed model). The four used principals are: 
1) Knowledge transfer – This is traditional training at its purest form by using external 
means, courses, workshops and exercises to achieve the EDL CDU goal to educate 
and train their members in information security; 
2) Knowledge exchange – According to EDL CDU objectives, EDL CDU wants to 
develop cooperation among qualified volunteer IT specialists. That is being done by 
organizing events among members and partner organizations i.e. get-together events, 
small seminars, brainstorming type of events and post exercise events; 
3) Knowledge collectivism – This principle is used for building essential trust between 
the members and between partner organizations. This is used to achieve the EDL 
CDU goal to create a network which facilitates public-private partnership and en-
hances preparedness in operating during a crisis situation; 
4) Knowledge distribution – One of the tasks which EDL CDU has been placed with is 
raising the level of cyber security for critical information infrastructures through the 
dissemination of knowledge and training (The Estonian Defence League, 2018). 
The final goal of participating in international cyber security training events can be achieved 
by following all these 4 principals together (The Estonian Defence League, 2018). Unfortu-
nately some of these international events have strict requirements to participants i.e. certif-
icate for classified information of foreign states. We have brought out an overview of some 
of these events (see Annex Services - suggested courses and curriculums) and DF commu-
nity requirements (see Annex Proposal for Digital Forensic Competency Model Framework 
based DOL Competency Model Tier 8) and standards (see Annex Proposal for Digital 
Forensic Competency Model Framework based DOL Competency Model Tier 9). Training 
is based around these principals and sketched out as following figure shows. 
 
Figure 10 Recruitment and development plan for new EDL CDU members (Põldmaa, 
2018) 
As the given figure shows, new members have to first go through the evaluation process. 
The evaluation process is based on a CV and recruits have to fill in a form. After the infor-
mation has been collected by the personnel specialist or team supervisor, the mapping of 
new recruits will be conducted. After this all newly added members will go through an uni-
fication course which, the goal of is to provide an overview of the unit's purpose, history, 
management, processes and activities. In the next phase, new members will be introduced 
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to and provided an overview of cyber threats and components of cyber defence this is called 
the orienteering phase. Here they will be given an overview and insight to new activities of 
different teams (the Red, Blue, White and Green teams). During this orienteering phase all 
new members who have filled in the forms and taken necessary tests, will be assigned to 
positions based on the test results and provided CVs. From this point forward integration of 
new members to EDL CDU activities will start. The assigned position is not fixed, changes 
might be made at any time on the request of the new member of by the unit commander, 
based on later studies and performance in different workshops, Tabletop Exercises (TTX), 
Functional Exercises (FE) and Full-Scale Exercises (FSE). EDL CDU has been trying to 
use this five year old plan and has noted that they need to re-evaluate this plan and need to 
develop specific learning paths for each of the branches. This thesis will be focusing on the 
Blue team that by 2018 has been divided into different sub-categories and proposing a new 
ontology within the ranks.  
As stated in the previous chapter, EDL CDU has to be ready to fill in the role of RIA CERT, 
EDF CIRC or any other unit that is requiring EDL CDU assistant. The principal which the 
EDL CDU has been trying to achieve, is to work out the same unit structure and the roles as 
CSIRT teams. Given the small differences, that CSIRT team may consist of 19 different 
members who have specific roles, the EDL has tried to take the specific role and apply it to 
groups (e.g. First responder is not one member rather a separate First responder group con-
sisting up to 10 EDL CDU members). The development of CDU internal structure is still 
going through changes, triggered by the need of expansion, which might suggest that there 
will not be just one group per role, but several. Their current development plan at this mo-
ment needs to be updated. The current structure has only managed to man 7 out of the 19 
CSIRT roles (see Figure 11).  
 
Figure 11 Key roles manned by EDL CDU and the missing roles (Põldmaa, 2018) 
Although the EDL CDU has a Red (Penetration testing), White (no longer used, outdated 
position) and Green team (Communications and Information Technology Department), the 
focus will be on the Blue team (Forensic’ branch). Next we will be proposing DF workforce 
competency model, bringing out the desired outcomes for DF and provide a proposal for the 
DF’ structure changes for a better overview and management over specialists teams. 
3.2 Proposal for DF workforce competency model 
As stated in previous section the EDL CDU will have to do various tasks and be ready to 
assist different agencies/organizations related to cyber security. There is a wide range of 
tasks which DF experts must master. Here are some of those tasks: 
Director
Incident Handler
Forensic Analyst
Sensor Network Engineer
Penetration Tester
Network Monitor
Network Analyst
Team Leader
First Responder
Triage Analyst
Incident Analyst
Security System Engineer
Advisory Writer/Publisher
Threat Analyst
Vulnerabilty Analyst
Malware Analyst
Trainer/Instructor
Administrato
Audit specialist
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 Conducting data breaches and security incident’s investigations; 
 Recover and examine data; 
 Dismantle and rebuild damaged systems; 
 Identify additional threats and compromises; 
 Compile digital evidence; 
 Establish and maintain a chain of custody; 
 Write reports; 
 Counsel law enforcement agencies and other entities about digital evidence; 
 Advise investigators on the credibility of the collected data; 
 Provide testimonies; 
 Train other parties on digital evidence procedures. 
In this list of tasks, the specialist has to come against data breaches and security incidents, 
which they need to conduct investigations in partnership with law enforcement agencies or 
other entities. These incidents can be high profile and highly damaging against a countries 
infrastructure or a company’s value. Great deal of challenges arise here as the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) has made “digging” in the files and publishing finds compli-
cated. This brings the need for specialists’ legal training, as well as training in documenting 
findings, giving presentations, defending their findings and training their successors in line. 
Nevertheless foremost the expert has to be at the top of the field, must keep up to date with 
emerging technologies, software and methodologies and be proficient in forensics, response 
and reverse engineering skills. Not to mention the need for lots of practice. 
Unfortunately only technical skills do not make a good DF’s expert. Technical skills do not 
reflect other necessary qualities and knowledge of the experts. To be regarded as a good 
forensics’ specialist, one needs to have certain personal characteristics and key attributes, 
for example: 
1) Time-management skills; 
2) Self-motivation; 
3) Excellent communicator, fluent in occupational terminology and writing.  
The need for communication skills is mainly necessary for experts who have to provide 
testimonies and give technical reports. Other technical qualities are the following: the 
knowledge about how to find and expose hidden, deleted, encrypted or obscured files, logs, 
browsing history and understand the types of legal evidence and legal rules regarding how 
evidence is collected, analysed, and reported. Also an expert should have the knowledge of 
security incidents, attack methodologies, incident response, access control mechanisms, in-
cluding authentication and authorization, rights and privileges, accounts and controls, en-
cryption/decryption, and how to attack and penetrate digital defences including technical 
attacks and social engineering (Tittel, 2017). We have mapped along with DOL competency 
model these competencies in our Proposal for Digital Forensic Competency Model 
Framework based DOL Competency Model. Due to all these requirements, it is very diffi-
cult to find good specialists and companies and institutions that have taken it upon them-
selves to train experts in their own institutions are at high risk, because experience in the 
workforce market shows that trained professionals are willing to move to another company 
or to another country as soon as they have achieved the necessary knowledge and degree. 
Other general skills should be project management, team building, intruder techniques, com-
pliancy laws, privacy laws, ethics, GDPR, etc. (Carnegie Mellon University, 2017). 
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For this we have suggested an instructional strategy for DF’s fully adapted revised Bloom’s 
Taxonomy (see Annex Suggested Instructional Strategies for Digital Forensics Use With 
Each Level of revised Bloom's Taxonomy): 
Knowledge – Demonstrate memory of previously learned skills by recalling facts, describ-
ing terms, identifying goals, naming methods, locating material and finding answers by all 
means necessary. 
Understanding – Demonstrating your understanding of overall facts, ideas, methods by in-
terpreting, summarizing, inferring, paraphrasing, classifying, comparing, explaining, exem-
plifying, giving descriptions and stating main ideas. 
Applying – Characteristic words like implementing, carrying out, using, executing. Solving 
problems and incidents by applying acquired knowledge, facts, techniques and standards 
made available to you. 
Analysing – Characteristic words like comparing, organizing, deconstructing, attributing, 
outlining, finding, structuring, integrating. Testing, breaking, finding evidences and exam-
ining information by identifying motives and causes. Finding support and evidence to your 
claims. 
Evaluating – Characteristic words like checking, hypothesizing, critiquing, experimenting, 
judging, testing, detecting, monitoring. Presenting and defending opinions and findings by 
judging evaluations based on a set of standards and criteria. 
Creating – Characteristic words like designing, compiling, constructing, planning, produc-
ing, inventing, devising, making. Proposing new or alternative solutions. 
Proposed model is calculated to be with long lasting effects though it also has a long imple-
menting phase. To have full effect on the organization, it is estimated to be as long as 5 
years according to validators (described in Chapter Assessment of the Digital Forensic’ 
workforce development plan for the EDL CDU). Implementing phases are divided into 5 
groups (see Figure 12): 
 
Figure 12 DF workforce competency development plan 
In the first phase “Capability Mapping” we propose our DF’s Competency model (see An-
nex Proposal for Digital Forensic Competency Model Framework based DOL Competency 
Model) which is the employee’s and unit’s capability mapping stage, as it fulfills the role of 
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mapping competencies with the proposed table of organization’s team members by mapping 
the individual skills and knowledge (competencies) of your team members. After distin-
guishing each specialists’ competencies the team leader/supervisor can draw the teams’ 
overall competencies and limitations. As we suggest, the aim is to show the capability of 
the unit to partners and allies, within which competence your unit can assist; 
The second phase “Setting Goals/Changes” we see it as organizational prioritizing and focus 
point's re-evaluation phase. Along with the capability mapping the goals and focus points 
might show shift in previously marked goals and this is a perfect opportunity to adapt these 
remarks accordingly – goals and lessons identified during the member/unit evaluation. If 
the unit is purely Network-oriented or First Responder-oriented and competence mapping 
shows that the required list of competencies is sufficient for the team (the level of compe-
tence meets 100% of the organization's/agencies goals), changes can be made to the table to 
simplify the subsequent recruitment process as well as to facilitate the training of new em-
ployees to the level of competence of the unit; 
The third phase “Training” we see as an addition to mapping staff and unit competences and 
incorporating changes. This phase is necessary for mapping the courses/trainings, where the 
necessary skills and knowledge were addressed and created by the company training plan. 
By mapping these training sessions, staff training for the unit will be achieved quicker, hav-
ing created a competence-based training plan for existing and future employees; 
The fourth phase “Recruitment”, we see the model as a tool for employees’ recruitment as 
a basis for the skills base. Evaluating the level of correspondence with the needs of the unit 
through practical tasks or interviews and if there is a lack of competence, how much training 
is necessary to meet the required level of competence (priority is set in phases 1 to 3 to 
achieve the exact level of your specific role); 
Final phase is the “Continuous development” which begins as soon as phases 1 – 4 have 
been put to use. We see it as stagnation prevention, competence development – we empha-
size that the proposal is not intended to marginalize the level of expertise and knowledge of 
existing professionals (an employee who exactly meets the needs of his/her position e.g. 
Windows based specific analyst or Android based analyst), but to highlight the spectrum of 
competences in the field of digital expertise to encourage professionals and managers to 
develop their knowledge and to emphasize continuous training and development of DF’s 
skills. With this we insist EDL CDU team leaders to see the danger in the following – routine 
and stagnation, which may lead to problems i.e. work errors, lack of motivation, leaving 
work for new knowledge and challenges. 
3.2.1 Selected Competency levels 
The difficulty in mapping the baseline competency skills needed in DF is connected to the 
organizations structure, which the team or department has put together. Do they have spe-
cific units for handling the digital evidence and specific people for writing the reports and 
presenting them or do they have rapid reaction teams (incident response teams) where there 
may be specialists with multiple skillsets although not as specific as let’s say a Windows 
OS forensics expert. It is clear that to be an active, successful, DF’s specialist, you need to 
have basic IT skills and sector-specific skills. Cyber security industry workforce compe-
tency has been separated into 3 major groups and 9 tiers (see Figure 13) by the DOL Com-
petency Model Framework (Apollo Education Group Inc. and University of Phoenix, 2015) 
which we have made modifications for the purpose of developing DF workforce compe-
tency training and retaining model for the EDL CDU.  
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For our study we have selected DOL Competency Model Framework as a basis for devel-
oping the DF’s competency model. The end result is DF oriented competency model which 
includes the revised Bloom’s Taxonomy with additions to verbs and activities. We have 
implemented parts of DOL Competency Model (Tier system diagram and the baseline com-
petencies from Tiers 1-4) and the National Initiative for Cyber Security Education Curricu-
lar Frameworks. The modified competency model can be found in Annex Proposal for 
Digital Forensic Competency Model Framework based DOL Competency Model.  
 
Figure 13 Left - DOL Competency Model Framework; Right - DF Competency Model 
Framework (adapted from Competency Models for Enterprise Security and Cybersecurity, 
2015). 
 Foundational Competencies – Tiers 1 - 3 are the baseline competencies “skills that 
are required of any individual in the workforce” (Apollo Education Group Inc. and 
University of Phoenix, 2015). These should be common across Cyber Security and 
DF industry and occupations. 
 Cyber Security Related Competencies – Tiers 4 is specific to a Cyber Security 
work field or its subsector, however not specific to any occupation or role. Individ-
uals who have these competencies can be move across roles and occupations within 
the Cyber Security field (Apollo Education Group Inc. and University of Phoenix, 
2015). 
Our focus would lay on Tiers 5 to 10 (see Figure 14), as DOL Competency Model does not 
pre-define these Tiers because of their specificity and uniqueness to the jobs (Apollo 
Education Group Inc. and University of Phoenix, 2015), we made these specifics according 
to EDL CDU needs. This was done by reviewing training service providers and topics cov-
ered in educational curriculums and mapping the key topics and competencies. 
 Digital Forensics Occupation Competencies – Tiers 5 - 7 are highly specific to 
roles in the DF’s work field. These can be used to define specific DF’s job perfor-
mance criteria, identify the requirements for a specific credential (e.g. professional 
license, degree or certification) and create continuous workforce development plan 
(Apollo Education Group Inc. and University of Phoenix, 2015). After collecting 
these competencies and compiling them into framework table we followed up with 
mini-Delphi Single round technique due to our time restrictions (Pan, Vega, Vella, 
Archer, & Parlett, 1996). Estimated competencies needed for DF workforce (focus 
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group on EDL CDU) were presented to evaluators from which we collected the feed-
back. For evaluation we focused on the EDL CDU partners which they are required 
to assist. Feedback was collected from 15 field specialists (5 team leaders and 10 
specialists) from partner organizations. We encouraged constructive critique and we 
facilitated admission of errors. These remarks were put together in the final revised 
as which can be see Annex Proposal for Digital Forensic Competency Model 
Framework based DOL Competency Model (more of the evaluation process in sec-
tion Assessment of the Digital Forensic’ workforce development plan for the EDL 
CDU). 
 Digital Forensics Requirements/Limitations – Tier 8 provides the key functional 
roles which in DOL Competency Model provided the whole cybersecurity functional 
role, we on the other hand list DF’s field spectrum roles compiling the NRGD DF 
standard 1.1 and the roles from DOL Competency Model. Tier 9 contains restrictions 
and constraints as it provides restrictive circumstances if the EDL CDU wants to 
consider participate in investigations as DF’s experts. These restrictions are the com-
bined result of international Register of Court Experts in a Criminal Cases Decree 
(NRGD, 2018) and Forensic Examination Act (Forensic Examination Act, 2002). 
 Managerial Related Competencies – Management and overseeing positions are 
often focused on directing the activities the division’s and functions rather than 
workers. While there are overlapping or grey areas between managers and other 
roles, managers have a greater leadership role in an organization, have greater deci-
sion making powers and are held accountable for poorly made decisions and mis-
steps. As a result the fourth major level with Tier 10 was added to our model. 
 
Figure 14 Digital Forencis Specific Competencies (adabted from DOL Competency 
Model) 
We propose that before calling a worker “Specialist”, the recruit should be evaluated by the 
Competency Model Framework Tiers 1-3 (reminding that Tiers 1-4 have been mapped by 
US Department of Labor) and be graded according to the organizations’ needs. Tier 1 shows 
Personal Effectiveness, e.g. displaying the skills to work effectively with others, displaying 
moral principals, demonstrating a commitment to self-development and improvement of 
knowledge and skills. Tier 2 gives an overview of if in the future a member of the organi-
zation is suitable for further testing or training within the ranks. Tiers 3 shows if the new 
member is a team player or likes to work alone and if they have the potential to run projects 
and make difficult decisions even under pressure. Tiers 1-3 will mainly give oversight in 
the candidate’s knowledge about PCs, tablets, phones, networks, and Internet and com-
monly known problems, issues and some experience about security, safety, and preventative 
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maintenance of IT systems. These first three tiers we can acknowledge as “Junior Special-
ist/Analyst” level. These new recruits are the students who are performing common tasks, 
working and learning simultaneously. They will be new to an organizational working life-
style. Students from the universities’ freshmen year or from conscription – they work day-
to-day, with a set of tasks given by supervisors and just beginning to investigate the profes-
sional options for their specialization field. They mostly have simpler skills, and tasks that 
are pre-requisites to a specialist being effective in this job role. 
We suggest that on an “Specialist/Analyst” level is candidate who has acquired Tier 4 mid-
level knowledge, skills, abilities and tasks. These specialists familiar in conceptualizing, 
designing, and building secure IT system’s, providing the support and administration nec-
essary to ensure effective IT systems performance and security (Apollo Education Group 
Inc. and University of Phoenix, 2015). 
“Advanced Analyst” level specialist is someone who has mastered his or her DF’s subdivi-
sion skills in the Tiers 5 and 6. It must be noted that a specialist can already be declared an 
advanced specialist even if he has mastered a portion of the competency listed in the model. 
Main focus here is that a specialist who has a higher level knowledge and skills in their work 
field and has proven to be very effective in this functional area. However we want to men-
tion that some lower level, pre-requisite competencies may be left uncovered. 
“Expert Analyst” level specialist is someone who has almost complete knowledge of their 
specific knowledge area. These experts can be enrolled in high value investigations, man-
aging projects and assessing others’ research and work. Tier 7 speaks about such specialists’ 
competencies and is looked at as a highly focused area and assumes someone is already well 
trained and effective in this job role overall. Tier 7 expert focuses on expertise in a very 
specific, narrow area. Additionally if somebody wanted to be considered an expert in the 
eyes of Estonian judicial system, Tier 9 has to be followed. 
Thus we have made a proposal for a Digital Expertise Competence Model (Annex Proposal 
for Digital Forensic Competency Model Framework based DOL Competency Model), 
which is based on the NICE and the DOL Competency model and we urge EDL CDU to 
adapt both this pre-defined model with DF’s ontology (Annex Digital Forensic ontology 
on the example of EDL CDU). This tool does not aim to marginalize the expertise and 
knowledge of existing professionals. However also to create a competency stairway that 
corresponds to the needs and specifications which currently are offered by internationally 
renowned training and certification bodies - to train the DF’s workforce in areas that inter-
nationally renowned top-level professionals find necessary. The goal is to provide the or-
ganization with a model of continuous development support that provides development op-
portunities for professionals at basic, intermediate, advanced and expert levels. With this, 
we try to create a situation where we avoid stagnation of specialists' skills and, consequently 
remove possibilities of resignation from the expert side. One way to solve this problem 
would be, in our opinion, a continuous development. In this case, the organization offers its 
specialists the opportunity to organize trainings, competitions and co-operation within the 
organization, for example, by applying the skills and knowledge of experienced profession-
als by training younger colleagues or allowing them to give lectures related to the profes-
sion. For our part, we propose a specialist’s evaluation table (see Annex Proposal for Digital 
Forensic Competency Model Framework based DOL Competency Model) that lists the 
competencies. The assessment of the competency model has been carried out by experts in 
the field (e.g. Police and Border Guard Board, NCIRC, EDF), who are charged with elec-
tronic evidence at any level. A list of skills and knowledge is outlined using the revised 
Bloom taxonomy. In addition, we have identified key issues for evaluators to determine 
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whether the proposed model meets the needs of the digital expertise industry in improving 
the skills of the workforce and bringing in new specialists. Experts who will be trained by 
the model would increase the reliability of the unit or organization in managing and inves-
tigating incidents. Details on evaluations and results will be shown in Chapter 4 Assessment 
of the Digital Forensic’ workforce development plan for the EDL CDU. 
3.3 Proposal for new EDL CDU specialization structure layout 
To follow up to Hallett, Larson and Rashid study we decided that the closest framework 
with most in common traits for EDL CDU DF’s Evidence Handling Group was NICE. We 
took the NICE Framework as being the most favorable in training and career progression in 
mind for workforce development focusing on hire-to-retire principle. We suggest the EDL 
CDU to reformulate their structural components according the NICE Framework Compo-
nents’ relationships (see Figure 15). The color scheme is in relation to our view of EDL 
CDU proposal for DF’s ontology in Annex Digital Forensic ontology on the example 
of EDL CDU. 
 
Figure 15 Left - Relationships among NICE Framework Components on the (Newhouse, 
Keith, Scribner, & Witte, 2017); Right - the example in correspondence with Digital Fo-
rensic ontology (see Annex Digital Forensic ontology on the example of EDL 
CDU) 
After adapting the NICE Framework principals the new EDL CDU and EDL CDU DF’s 
Evidence Handling Group workforce specialty component relationship diagram should be 
illustrated as shown on Annex EDL CDU structure plan after NICE Framework implemen-
tation to Digital Evidence Handling Group structure and Annex EDL CDU structure plan 
after implemented NICE Framework Component relationship and partially in Annex Digi-
tal Forensic ontology on the example of EDL CDU. The reason in behind the first 
two layouts is due to EDL CDU’s demand, as the chief of EDL CDU has not been clear if 
they are planning to restructure the whole EDL CDU or their sub-branch Digital Evidence 
Handling Group. Eventually we should have managed to simplify grouping of DF’s work-
force topics and helped with the alignment in comparing with other frameworks. EDL CDU 
shall be divided into multiple specialty areas (e.g. in which case we have focused on DF’s 
Evidence handling group. Specialty roles are composed of work roles. Each work role (e.g. 
First Responder, Team leader, DF Analyst, DF Expert - Network) in turn, includes 
Knowledge, Skills, Abilities (KSA) and Tasks (see Annex EDL CDU structure plan after 
NICE Framework implementation to Digital Evidence Handling Group structure and Annex 
EDL CDU structure plan after implemented NICE Framework Component relationship). 
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Furthermore recruitment, hiring, educating, training, retention and development of highly 
skilled workforce should be under constant evaluation, so all members should have clear 
career pathways described and promote progressive challenges for specialist evolvement. 
The usage of competencies and tasks in all these processes can help the existing staff to 
develop unit capabilities.  
3.3.1 Proposal for a revised taxonomy of the DF standard 
During the work regarding DF’s taxonomy of NRGD, several instances came up which sug-
gested the taxonomy should be revised the same way as ISO standards, in 5 years or even 
less. The taxonomy must be up-do-date as the workforce development needs to be reviewed 
and planned accordingly. Thus the following revisions should be taken into account. 
Revised version of the Computer Forensics’ taxonomy 
First addition in DF’s subdivision is single-board computers in the Computer forensic dis-
cipline (seen and on Annex Digital Forensic ontology on the example of EDL CDU). 
These small general-purpose computers (which are little bit slower that regular computers,) 
can be used for running desktop applications or anything you could do on an ordinary house-
hold computer. These mini computers share similarities with laptops and regular computers 
such as USB ports for keyboard, mouse and other USB devices, HDMI port for monitor, 
Audio headphone port, Ethernet port, WiFi, Bluetooth, SD Card slots for storage and run on 
operating system (e.g. Rasbian, Windows 10 IoT Core, Snappy Ubuntu Core, SUSE, Ubuntu 
Mate, Kali Linux, CentOS), thus in simplification the Single-board computers should be 
dealt with the same care as laptops, PC’s and servers. 
Revised version of Software Forensics’ taxonomy 
Next we added a whole family of Malware subdivision and divided Operating Systems sub-
categories into three separate groups distinctive by platform in Software Forensics. Malware 
Forensics is covering the complete process of responding to a malicious code incidents. 
Specialists have to examine a systems to collect and preserve critical live data, furthermore 
they must be able to perform live forensics and evidence collection procedures on different 
live systems in the context of identifying and capturing malicious codes and evidence ef-
fecting on the compromised system (Aquilina, 2008). The categorizing of OS via platform 
is needed for DF experts in order to facilitate the work and professional distribution of spe-
cialty. As tablets, smartphones and consoles go additionally under device forensics category 
they are in close relations with software forensics due to software running on them. This 
brings the need for a revised version for Software Forensics’ taxonomy and introducing it 
for to simplify the development of the workforce development plan. 
Why separate malware into different categories? When we talk about malware, we tend to 
talk about Trojan horses, viruses, and ransomware, which generally has a damaging effect 
against all electronic data. As all classes of malicious software own a payload and have 
different effects and targets, we would propose an addition to Software Forensics branch in 
Malware category by dividing it into 5 main groups: Trojan horses, worms and viruses, 
malware and Crimeware (see Annex Digital Forensic ontology on the example of 
EDL CDU).  
Trojan horses often referred to as Trojans differ from other groups by not independently 
replicating themselves. Trojans disguise themselves as a program, of which particular func-
tion is desired by the user, hiding in themselves a payload. Methods of concealment are 
almost unlimited as they can hide in command lines for UNIX system administrators or turn 
up as Remote Access Trojans (known as RATs or simplified as backdoors) and they are sent 
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via email or ambush user in file sharing services or on websites. Their classification can be 
carried out based on their functions: Backdoors, Adware, Spyware, Scareware, Download-
ers, Diallers, Keyloggers, and Rootkits (G DATA Software AG, 2018) (McAfee, LLC, 
2019). 
Viruses aim to multiply themselves and spread over the network. Commonly they attach 
themselves to other files or embed themselves in the boot sector of data carriers and are 
often smuggled onto the PCs undetected on USB sticks, via networks, by email or via the 
Internet. Because of the versatility viruses can range from being a nuisance to being ex-
tremely dangerous. They can be divided into the following categories: Boot sector viruses, 
File viruses, Multipartite viruses, Companion viruses, Macro viruses, Stealth viruses and 
rootkits, Polymorphic viruses, Intended Virus and lastly Email viruses (G DATA Software 
AG, 2018). 
Worms are standalone software and do not require a host program or user to propagate. To 
spread, worms either exploit a vulnerability on the system or use some kind of social engi-
neering to trick users into executing them. It spreads by transferring itself via networks or 
computer connections to other computers. Their classification can be carried out based on 
their transport channel: Network worms, Email worms, Peer-to-peer worms and Instant 
Messaging Worms (G DATA Software AG, 2018). 
Crimeware is quite a new general term for software used to perpetrate crime, such as stealing 
personal identities, a computer user’s financial and retail accounts, money or proprietary 
information. Crimeware uses viruses, Trojans, worms, spyware, or adware and other types 
of malware to get access to the victims devices. Their classification is done based on their 
function: Ransomware, Point-of-Sale malware, Cryptomining malware and wipers (G 
DATA Software AG, 2018). 
Why distinguish OS via platform? What is the difference and why is it useful in the DF’s 
field? As we have mentioned the Device Forensics’ category before, the devices are divided 
into different branches and distinguishing Computer Forensic as a whole different forensic’ 
group. By doing this we eventually formulate a more structured way to rank and recommend 
competency training. What is the difference between our proposed platform OSs? First of 
all the difference is in the fundamental environments for software applications. Main issue 
is that computer operating systems were not really designed for mobile use over wireless 
networks, as they were developed for wired systems, focused on technical specifics (multi-
ple process handling, CPU operation, boot protocols). The computer forensic specialist must 
keep these facts in mind when choosing their training courses and keeping track of newly 
adaptable methods.  
Mobile OS however is developed for being used across wireless environments, providing 
consistent ease of network access, responsive designs and user friendly software applica-
tions while on move. One hybrid phone which is looking closely similar to today’s laptops 
and tablets alike is Samsung Galaxy Note 9 which is an Android tablet smartphone, which 
can be turned into small workstation via Samsung DeX docking station giving the user full 
personal computer capabilities (Kronfli, 2017).  
Video game consoles are increasingly similar to personal computers as well as to mobile 
systems, catching up computers in performance and software vise. For example the early 
console systems ran on a simple code on ROM chip which ran the specific code on the 
cartridge. Older Sony consoles ran all software from the actual disk. Later on they ran a 
small proprietary piece of code on a kernel, which was a so called OS between the hardware 
and the software. Next version of the Sony console (PS3) had a custom version of FreeBSD 
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system. From this moment on the consoles acted like computers, it booted up from the con-
soles hard drive, one had UI and xcross media bar and one would install games on top of 
that. Furthermore one could change the OS system on these, for example run Linux OS on 
them. As we talk about the nowadays consoles, the similarities are on the hardware side. All 
of them have GPU’s, HDD’s, optical drives, network connectivity (wired and wireless), 
however they run on different platform bases (Performance Optimization with Enhanced 
RISC – Performance Computing). Furthermore these systems run virtualization environ-
ments, basically running different OS at the same time (OS for settings menu, OS for run-
ning games). Nintendo on the other hand held different versions of IOS on the HDD. The 
reason was that games that used lets say IOS version 13 just booted up Nintendo Wii IOS 
version 13 and when changing disks, the device would take information from the disk and 
jump to IOS version that is needed to run for this game. This same functional structure was 
used in Nintendo Cube, so you could basically take the Cube’s games and play it on Wii U 
(Loveridge, 2016). 
Because of these differences, the previously mentioned taxonomy, distinguishing devices 
on OS level, was proposed for a better device forensic’ specialist competency training plan 
development. 
Revised version of the Device Forensics’ taxonomy 
New additions were suggested for Device Forensics’ taxonomies Small-scale devices. New 
category was added (Smart watches/activity trackers) and other categories were modified 
quite significantly (see Annex Digital Forensic ontology on the example of EDL 
CDU). 
Firstly the embedded chip devices were distinguished into 6 categories by their purpose 
(Avionics, Controllers, Automotive, Medical, Personal home appliances, security and espi-
onage). Though smart TV is not a small-scale device it can be categorized as an embedded 
chip device under the home appliance or moved to a large-scale devices as a new Smart-
Devices. This distribution was seen to be most useful when explaining the field knowledge 
competency for newly appointed DF’ specialists. Secondly new addition was proposed for 
mobile- and smartphones. Previous taxonomy only suggested distinguishing Phone memory 
cards and SIM cards although most new smartphones show the expansion of internal 
memory capacity, thus bringing into light a third category “Internal Memory” and changing 
Phone Memory Cards into External Memory. Thirdly we divided navigation systems by 
electronic methods (radio, radar and most satellite navigation). Furthermore it has to be 
mentioned that most of privately used ships navigation systems hold sonar capabilities. 
Fourthly a smart watch and an activity tracker category was introduced to this taxonomy 
with distinguishing devices via their operating systems (Android and Apple). And lastly we 
suggested a change in Personal Digital Assistants category to include E-readers.  
Revised version of the Network Forensics’ taxonomy 
As wireless communication involves security systems, remote controls, Wi-Fi, Cell phones 
and the Near Field Communication, wireless power transfer, computer interface devices and 
various wireless communication based projects, the need to write down a more detailed tax-
onomy for wireless subdivision is necessary. In terms of wireless systems’ and applications’ 
security issues, it should be divided according to system types, as it helps to compare and 
evaluate DF’s workforce competency. Within the Network Forensics we give a proposal 
distinguishing Wireless Forensics (see Annex Digital Forensic ontology on the exam-
ple of EDL CDU). 
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An overall security issue that is continuing to exist is the possibility that an unauthorized 
entity can capture the wireless signals which spread through the air. It is important to im-
prove securing measures for wireless networks and further develop and conduct counter 
intelligence in regards to seeing what can be recovered in different systems and by what 
means.  
The additions that where done to these DF’s taxonomy disciplines is our representation of 
giving a more detailed description and an overview to experts on the field, to better under-
stand in which category do they belong to and which technologies fall under their responsi-
bility. It is understood that digital and cyber is a fast growing and evolving field which can 
make a vast number or technologies obsolete or legacy technologies. It has to be noted, that 
it is better to have the knowledge and experience of old legacy systems, especially as they 
may be or are the technological solutions developed on the basis of these systems, thus we 
have left examples of legacy, such as in Software Forensics - FreeBSD or Network Foren-
sics - Infrared connections into these taxonomies. In Annex Proposal for new Digital Foren-
sic discipline – Unmanned SystemsVI we propose a whole new concept of digital forensic 
subdivision which introduces unmanned system forensics as a separate sub-discipline. In 
the next chapter we will focus on the DF’s workforce competency model. 
3.4 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter we described the contribution of this thesis by providing an answer to the 
research question “How to develop and retain DF workforce competency in EDL CDU?” 
(SRQ2 in Section Research Questions) and propose a DF’s workforce competency 
model(see Annex Proposal for Digital Forensic Competency Model Framework based DOL 
Competency Model), a revised DF’s standard taxonomy (see Annex Digital Forensic on-
tology on the example of EDL CDU) with additions to sub-disciplines (new sub-disci-
pline into DF taxonomy see Annex Proposal for new Digital Forensic discipline – Un-
manned Systems) and a proposal for a new structural layout for EDL CDU (see Annex EDL 
CDU structure plan after NICE Framework implementation to Digital Evidence Handling 
Group structure and Annex EDL CDU structure plan after implemented NICE Framework 
Component relationship). 
Before we can start developing and retaining the EDL CDU’s DF’s workforce competency, 
we first have to bring out the current stages. 
How is the current EDL CDU shaped? – EDL CDU is an unit in a voluntary organization 
aimed at protecting the Estonian cyberspace. Emphasis on the voluntary part – members of 
the unit are Estonian patriots with IT skills, experienced specialists in key nationally critical 
infrastructural cyber security positions and in other fields concerning cyber security (The 
Estonian Defence League, 2018). Estonian Regulation No. 108, shows the EDL CDU’s co-
operation with PBGB, RIA CERT and EDF in their core roles in defending Estonia cyber-
space. This means that the EDL CDU has to fulfill their key functions, which are: 
1) Mitigating and preventing major incidents and helping to protect organizations val-
uable assets; 
2) to have a centralized coordination for IT security issues within the organization 
(Point of Contact); 
3) to have a centralized and specialized handling of and response to IT incidents; 
4) to have the expertise at hand to support and assist the users with quickly recovering 
from security incidents; 
5) to help with legal issues and preserving evidence in the event of a lawsuit. 
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For this purpose the EDL CDU has been using their own structural layout which mainly 
consists of Red, Blue, Green and previously White groups. The Blue further known as DF’s 
group is divided into 5 sub-disciplines (see list below):  
1) Network Forensic; 
2) Database Forensic; 
3) OSINT; 
4) Legal Department; 
5) Forensic. 
As the EDL CDU has to be ready to fill in the CSIRT role for PBGB, RIA CERT, EDF 
CIRC or any other unit that requires EDL CDU’s assistant, the unit’ roles should match 
CSIRT team roles. Given the small difference, that a CSIRT team may consist of 19 differ-
ent members who have specific roles, the EDL has gone with the role per group or team 
model (e.g. First responder is not a solely one member, but a separate First responder group 
consisting up to 10 EDL CDU members). As the unit is based on voluntary members, work-
force recruitment and continuous training fare the troublesome points in the EDL CDU. For 
this the members of EDL CDU have to fulfill certain key requirements and guidelines set 
up for DF specialist roles. One of which is Netherlands Advisory Committee of Standards 
(ACS), ISO and the NRGD’s DF standard’s which distinguishes 6 subfields of DF (Com-
puter Forensics, Software Forensics, Database Forensics, Multimedia Forensics, Device Fo-
rensics and Network Forensics). By the NRGD, the DF is a discipline of forensic sciences 
and therefore should be reviewed under ISO standards (overview can be see Annex Over-
view of standards regulating Digital Forensic community). As EDL CDU recruits and also 
is responsible for training their members, they have used 4 shared knowledge principals: 
1) Knowledge transfer; 
2) Knowledge exchange; 
3) Knowledge collectivism; 
4) Knowledge distribution. 
EDL CDU main goal is to get as much practice as possible in DF community and to partic-
ipate in national and international cyber security training events which have set certain re-
strictions to training and recruitment policies. We have brought out overview of some of 
these events (see Annex Services - suggested courses and curriculums) and DF community 
requirements which EDL CDU might come up against (see Annex Proposal for Digital 
Forensic Competency Model Framework based DOL Competency Model Tier 9). 
SRQ2 – How to develop and retain DF’s workforce competency in the EDL CDU? 
We shall answer this question with two parts, firstly “How to develop DF’s workforce’s 
competency?” and secondly “How to retain DF workforce’s competency in EDL CDU?” 
For development of DF’s competencies we have seen fitting to combine a NICE DOL Com-
petency framework, DF’s Standard 1.1, revised Bloom’s Taxonomy with changes to DF’s 
community(see Annex Suggested Instructional Strategies for Digital Forensics Use With 
Each Level of revised Bloom's Taxonomy), and DF ontology model(see Annex Digital 
Forensic ontology on the example of EDL CDU) to eventually create a task based 
competency model(see Annex Proposal for Digital Forensic Competency Model 
Framework based DOL Competency Model). Proposed model is calculated to be with long 
lasting effects though also has a long implementing phase. To have full effect on the EDL 
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CDU organization we could estimate maximum of 5 years (according to validators described 
in Section 4.1). Implementing phases are divided into 5 groups (see Figure 12): 
1) Capability Mapping 
2) Setting and re-evaluating Goals 
3) Training 
4) Recruitment 
5) Continuous development (falls into second part of SRQ2 – Retaining DF compe-
tency in EDL CDU). 
The model can be used in any time in these phases. Marking the evaluation by using the 
GAP analyses by “achieved” or “desired”, marking the level of importance by “not applica-
ble”, “preferred” or “essential”, using it as a recruitment baseline or for mapping and plan-
ning the course/training roadmap. As a result of these evaluations and from remarks by 
evaluators, we have compiled DF’s workforce competency suggestions. Tiers which we fo-
cused on were Tiers 5-7. 
In the second part of SRQ – “How to retain DF’s workforce competency?” we suggest our 
proposed models’ 5th phase “Continuous development” which is supported by Annex Ser-
vices - suggested courses and curriculums. We provide an overview of courses, curriculums 
and exercises which support training in different levels – trainee/student, trainer/teacher, 
evaluator or planner/organizer. We see it as a preventive measure for workforce stagnation 
and as a possibility for a continuous development of competences. We emphasize that the 
proposed model (specially the evaluation of existing specialists) is not intended to margin-
alize the level of expertise and knowledge of existing professionals (an employee who ex-
actly meets the needs of his/her position e.g. Windows based specific analyst or Android 
based analyst), but to highlight the spectrum of competences in the field of digital expertise 
to encourage professionals and managers to develop their knowledge and to emphasize con-
tinuous training and development of DF’s skills. With this we insist that the EDL CDU’s 
team leaders see danger in following – routine and stagnation, which may lead to problems 
i.e. work errors, lack of motivation, leaving work for new knowledge and challenges. 
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4 Evaluation of Digital Forensics’ workforce development plan 
In this chapter we show a series of results of the evaluation process and try to answer SRQ3 
– What are the means of validating of the workforce competency development model? 
We will give the reader an overview of the evaluation of the proposed model and remarks 
given by the evaluators, who are leading experts of partner organizations from the DF’s field 
of work. 
Evaluation was done by identifying whether the intended competency model is usable in the 
DF’s field for the purpose of the EDL CDU to assess the workforce and the overall unit 
through different key components and competency deficiencies, from an actual planning of 
learning opportunities and content will be specified. The assessment focuses on the utility 
of the thesis’s proposals and the evaluation was judged by their usability. The primary in-
tended users are DF’s organizations, especially personnel managements. Primary uses are 
for recruitment, training and development of future DF’s specialists for the job at hand and 
to be prepared to assist other agencies in their work. Three groups were monitored during 
the evaluation: 
 Utility - Evaluation will show if this proposal serves the information needs of in-
tended users (EDL CDU). 
 Feasibility - Evaluation will show if this proposal is realistic, prudent and frugal. 
 Accuracy - Evaluation will show if this proposal will reveal and convey technically 
adequate information about the features that determine the worth or merit of the 
evaluated program. 
In the first part we looked over the assessment done by leading experts of the DF’ workforce 
development plan for DF’s specialists intended for EDL CDU. Evaluation letters were sent 
to TalTech19, CERT, EDF, RIA, PBGB, Clarified Security20, EKEI, Eesti Energia AS21, The 
U.S. Military Academy at West Point, The U.S. Naval Academy, Canadian Armed Forces, 
NCIRC TC and stakeholder’s assessment by chief of the EDL CDU Chief Andrus Padar22. 
The total of organizations/units contacted was fifteen, out of which seven responded in time, 
with answers to KEQs and specialist opinions. We gathered fifteen team leaders/specialists 
feedbacks which were compiled into our model (see Annex Proposal for Digital Forensic 
Competency Model Framework based DOL Competency Model) and calculated arithmetic 
mean for level of priority(e.g. 1-Not Applicable, 2-Preferred, 3-Essential) to each topic/task 
for our focus groups. 
4.1 Assessment of the Digital Forensic’ workforce development plan for 
the EDL CDU 
Assessment of the proposal for DF’s Competency Model’s Framework was done by experts 
and professionals from different units, both national and international, to get the highest 
                                                 
19 TalTech School of Information Technologies: Department of Software Sciences, Project Manager of Digital 
Forensics. 
20 Clarified Security is an Estonian information security company focused in delivering practical security ser-
vices (manual WebApp pentesting) and deliver remote testing and on-site training services globally. 
21 Eesti Energia is a state-owned international energy company that operates in the electricity and gas markets 
of the Baltic countries and Poland, also in the international liquid fuels market. Eesti Energia is responsible of 
ensuring the security of electricity supply in Estonia. 
22 Chief of Estonian Defence League’s Cyber Unit and co-writer of competency- based educational model for 
the criminal police. Development of the competence of the criminal police officer through practice and science. 
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variety of qualitative and authoritative feedback. A direct and explicit key evaluation ques-
tions – Key Evaluation Questions (KEQs) – were assigned with the aim to determine 
whether the proposed model fulfills the DF’s industry needs in improving the workforce 
competency and continuation of comprehensive performance by DF’s specialists. The pur-
pose of this model is that it would ensure the units integrity and reliability in incident man-
agement and investigation. 
Evaluations were conducted under the following categories: 
1) Purpose: are all relevant competencies covered by this model; 
2) Learning: does this model contribute to consistent improvement of the DF’s work-
force competence; 
3) Comparison: does this model contribute to the current workforce development plan; 
4) Applicability: would this model be more cost effective and less time consuming than 
the current personnel management development plan. 
4.1.1 Key evaluation questions and supportive evaluation questions 
1) KEQ1 – Does the proposed model support organization-wide goals?  
a) SEQ1 – Does this model support the unit's workforce development plan (e.g. 
method relevance, workplace compliance, and process efficiency)?  
b) SEQ2 – What do you think of the overall structure? What alterations would you 
make?  
2) KEQ2 – Could this model be most beneficial in terms of workforce performance im-
provement or continuation of good performance in areas of importance (i.e., speed of 
obtaining digital evidence)?  
3) KEQ3 – What shall be the complexities and problems in terms of exchanging the cur-
rent workforce development plan to the proposed model?  
a) SEQ3 – How does it compare (e.g. level, cost, time spent, unit’s size redundancy / 
recruitment)?  
b) SEQ4 – What is the forecast for reaching the full extent of the previous work ca-
pacity and which of the results reflect the fulfillment of previous processes and 
work unit’s standards to support organization-wide goals?  
4.1.2 Evaluation of model’s utility, feasibility and accuracy 
During the evaluation process “5Ws” were used to prove the models applicability – Who, 
What, Where, When and Why. Evaluation will show if this proposal serves the information 
needs of the intended users (EDL CDU). 
Who benefits from this? The key figures who will benefit from this model will be the com-
manders of the unit and the human resources department, who are responsible for hiring 
new members and developing the workforce training plan. 
For whom is this model harmful for? It has to be noted that this model may be used in the 
wrong means, by this we mean showing the workers’ lack of knowledge and using it to their 
disadvantage, which would result in pay cuts. As the purpose of this model is not to mar-
ginalize the specialists’ competencies, it is used foremost to show the wide spectrum of 
competencies, which could be trained in the specialist. 
Who shall be making decisions about the use and focus of this model? The key people in 
the first two stages (mapping the specialists and the whole units competencies, mapping the 
priorities and focus points of the unit) will be the specialists and group leaders, who will be 
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determining the baseline of the working unit and its basic needs. Additionally the decision 
making will go to the unit commanders and human recourses department who shall continue 
with mapping courses and start with recruitment and developing workforce training plan. 
Who will be affected directly? The focus group is and will be the DF’s specialist. 
Who are affected by this problem – the lack of this development plan? Interviews showed 
that similar problems arose in every agency i.e. lack of existing specialists’ development 
plan, lack of information from partner agencies about their competencies, lack of infor-
mation about courses, which specialist could take. 
Who will be the key people in this model? As previously mentioned in the decision making 
question, the key people shall be the DF’s specialists, team leaders/commanders and human 
resources department’s personnel, who are responsible of training and recruitment. 
What are this models strengths? The biggest strength will be mapping the specialist’s com-
petencies and furthermore mapping the current competencies of the unit/agency/organiza-
tion. This will be followed by simplifying the workforce training and recruitment phases 
and working on continues development. 
What are this model’s weaknesses? The two major weaknesses have been stated. First is the 
initial mapping of competencies which may take up to weeks or months, depending of the 
organization size and second is testing or proving of the competencies, which organization 
have to work out themselves or with partner agencies. After these tests have been developed, 
it would simplify the whole process. 
What is another alternative to this model? Human resources department will continue their 
current recruitment and workforce development plan if the organization has one.  
What is the best case scenario? In this case the best case scenario is that not only does the 
EDL CDU adapt the model as their official workforce development tool, but it will be 
adapted by the EDF and other agencies as well. Furthermore Estonia would adapt the NICE 
framework to start the development of a wholesome Cyber Security workforce. 
What is the worst case scenario? The worst case scenario is that main focus group (EDL 
CDU Digital Evidence Handling Group) will not adapt the model and it will be deemed as 
unapplicable/usable by the stakeholders. 
What is the most/least important focus point of this outcome? The most important outcome 
is the stakeholders’ goodwill of reaching to the outcome which they have to fulfill – to assist 
partner agencies. 
Where would we see this being used? In organizations who are in contact with digital evi-
dence and DF in general – law enforcement, armed forces, CERT, organizations with inter-
nal capabilities of such competencies. 
When will this model be used by the EDL CDU? EDL CDU Digital Evidence Group chief 
has notified me that this model will be put to use in April 2019 (Põldmaa, 2018). According 
to chief of EDL CDU the model has all the needs met for their 
Why is it relevant to us? As the EDL CDU is a voluntary organization and a national defence 
organization, it is necessary to recruit and motivate members to give their contribution to 
national defence  (Põldmaa, 2018). New members must be found for national defence from 
exercises and competitions and motivating them with continuous development possibilities 
is necessary. The possibility of recruiting MSc degree students or graduates are slim, thus 
motivating existing members and recruiting new highly motivated members is essential.  
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4.2 Answers to Key Evaluation Questions 
In this chapter we show a series of evaluation results and answer research question SRQ3 – 
What are the means of validating the workforce competency development model by 
giving the reader overview of evaluation of the proposed model and remarks given by the 
evaluators from leading experts and partner organizations on the DF field of work. 
For this we set up series of key evaluation questions (KEQ) and supportive evaluation ques-
tions. We are giving concluding answers with both positive and negative observations in 
mind. Answers were submitted in different forms i.e. interviews (personal meetings and via 
telephone), emails and official letters. No major conflicting opinions were observed, alt-
hough all negative issues have been regarded in the answers and conclusions. 
1) KEQ1 – Does the proposed model support organizational-wide goals?  
After receiving the feedbacks from the evaluators the conclusive answer is – Yes it would 
support the organizational-wide goals. It is believed that this model links organizational 
objectives and a gives clear description of the ‘problem’ which is recruitment, development 
and retention issues linked to lack of appropriate plans and policies. Evaluators particularly 
liked the approach to providing clear responsibilities and a step by step list of competencies 
that would allow for career change/progression in an individual. This would assist in internal 
promotion and job satisfaction. There are feedbacks which show consistency of workforce 
commenting that the satisfaction in doing the job is an important part of their retention. 
Providing this framework must therefore be even more positive in a volunteer environment. 
a) SEQ1 – Does this model support the unit's workforce development plan (e.g. 
method relevance, workplace compliance, and process efficiency)?  
The model focuses on skills on the other hand also contains much information that could be 
used to build RACI23 models and even incident procedures. It is believed that it is through 
these steps suggested by thesis author both efficiency and trustworthiness could be improved 
through a more defined and transparent set of capabilities vs tasks. Consequently, this ap-
proach should lead to better effectiveness, and that can then be accredited and audited 
against the model. This should deliver assurance and supports the good governance of the 
organization. This must be a powerful benefit for such non-traditional approaches to cyber 
security as the EDL CDU. 
b) SEQ2 – What do you think of the overall structure? What alterations would you 
make?  
Based on the evaluators’ feedbacks the model would make Human Resources department 
work easier by making demands for recruiting new employees. Officially the model might 
need organizational or board approval, unofficially it could be used immediately. Although 
the model could unofficially be used promptly, there were suggestions for making more 
easy-to-use.  
Firstly from the private sector the issue was moreover that a good specialist should not be a 
good communicator which this thesis suggests. In the feedback to suggestion was that me-
diators should be used. The problem lies in training timeframe, there is not enough time in 
one person's life to learn good personality qualities and at the same time to acquire vast 
amount of technological skills. Somewhere it would be necessary to draw a line that "this is 
                                                 
23 RACI matrix is a visual representation of each individual's role within that process identifying those who 
are Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, and Informed (Jacka & Keller, 2012). 
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good enough". For example, we assume that the subordinate must have very good commu-
nication skills, however we do not expect the superior to have good technical skills to un-
derstand the subordinate. So there are problems here. The superior should have an under-
standing of the technical vocabulary to come halfway through the lack of communication 
with its subordinates. In the public/military sector the superior is mostly signed from the 
ranks of subordinates which makes them equally competent in related field. 
Secondly the need for consolidation was mentioned, as this model on the basis of Tiers 6-
10 have not been tested, it should be piloted and then consolidated with key competences 
for better specialization and easier handling. 
Thirdly the issue of replication. Some of the competencies have been noted to be either 
replicated or near-replicated, which make the table long and a little cumbersome to use. 
Table should be reevaluated and listed. 
Lastly the issue of presentation. Feedback and interviews conducted clearly showed that the 
model layout and perspectives should be redesigned somehow. Model should be presentable 
in Pivot table form or similar to allow concept to be viewed from differing perspectives. 
These suggestions make primary suggestions for future work on the basis of model adjust-
ment. 
2) KEQ2 – Could this model be most beneficial in terms of workforce performance im-
provement or continuation of good performance in areas of importance (i.e., speed of 
obtaining digital evidence)? 
The use of 10 Tiers works well, giving a clear structure and placing equal value on Mana-
gerial and Technical skills – this is better than the approach many organizations take, which 
lacks that transparency. It can be said that this model can absolutely be seen providing a 
structured approach to development that supports skillset development and individual ad-
vancement.  
3) KEQ3 – What shall be the complexities and problems in terms of exchanging current 
workforce development plan to model being proposed?  
Evaluators’ feedback showed full support on the approach taken, though suspect that the 
size of the plan will hinder its implementation, especially wherever it is used by non-spe-
cialists (e.g. HR). Staff will be able to see what they need to learn to advance themselves – 
that is clear and motivational. 
a) SEQ3 – How does it compare (e.g. complexity level, cost, time spent, unit size re-
dundancy / recruitment)?  
Complexity is the biggest challenge in this plan, which is to be expected when synthesising 
concepts. 
b) SEQ4 – What is the prognoses of reaching the full extent of previous work capac-
ity and to which your results reflect the fulfillment of your previous processes and 
work unit standards to support organizational-wide goals? 
Feedback that the model would hold wholly positive effect for work capacity, as it will be 
believed that with the minor modification and following some pilot implementations, the 
model would be beneficial in both improving the skills of the workforce and recruiting new 
specialists. The full effect would be see 5-10 years after a quick evaluation, as the model 
contains a vast number of competencies that specialist today lack. The amount of training 
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needed cannot be completed in a short time. Additionally the resources for training are lim-
ited and need to be requested by the organization board. It seems that it is cheaper to hire 
new people, although already mentioned, it is almost impossible to find a specialist with all 
the required qualities and competencies. 
In conclusion we can answer to SRQ3 - What are the means of validating the workforce 
competency development model by emphasizing that to improve and to validate EDL 
CDU's competency in DF community the main goal is to raise the volume of collaboration 
in investigations, participation in co-operated exercises and gaining more feedback from 
partner organizations about their results. This will ultimately raise their credibility and this 
in turn increases their involvement in protecting Estonia’s information infrastructure and 
supporting broader objectives of national defence (The Estonian Defence League, 2018). 
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5 Concluding remarks 
This thesis gives an overview and proposals for the DF workforce’s competency based de-
velopment and retaining plan. The model contributes to understanding the DF's competency-
based training and its processes. In addition, there are suggestions for supplementing the 
DF’s taxonomy model, changing the structure of the EDL CDU and distributing a new 
branch of DF’s standards. The validation of the model took place through partner institu-
tions, both national and international ones. The first level was the validation of competen-
cies, where the competencies to be assessed were given to professionals to comment and 
prioritize. The second level of validation was based on the management level - evaluating 
the unit's growth of effectiveness, based on the organization’s estimation assessment. Risks 
from feedbacks were studied and proposals for changes were implemented. 
5.1 Answers to Research Questions 
In this chapter we shall sum up all answers to main and supportive research questions. 
MRQ – How to create effective Digital Forensic workforce competency based (compe-
tency structure) development and retaining a model for EDL CDU staff? This question 
was broken down into several sub-research-questions (SRQ): 
SRQ1 – What is the current emphasis and constraints of DF’s workforce development 
and training within the ranks of the EDL CDU? We investigated the existing EDL 
CDU’s training program and decide which properties need to be considered for further de-
velopment. Information was gathered and modeled using the GAP analyses method. In con-
clusion we can answer to SRQ1 by pointing out that EDL CDU is a unit in a voluntary 
organization aimed at protecting Estonian cyberspace with its main mission to protect Esto-
nia’s information infrastructure and support broader objectives of national defence (The 
Estonian Defence League, 2018). EDL CDU can be called upon to service according to the 
Estonian Regulation No. 108, which mandates them to be used to fulfill the core roles in 
PBGB, RIA CERT and EDF in defending Estonia cyberspace. For this the members of EDL 
CDU have to fulfill certain key requirements and guidelines set up for DF specialist’s roles. 
One of which is Netherlands Advisory Committee of Standards (ACS), ISO and the 
NRGD’s DF standard’s which distinguishes 6 subfields of DF(Computer Forensics, Soft-
ware Forensics, Database Forensics, Multimedia Forensics, Device Forensics and Network 
Forensics). By the NRGD, the DF is a discipline of forensic sciences and therefore should 
be reviewed under ISO standards (overview can be see Annex Overview of standards regu-
lating Digital Forensic community). As the EDL CDU recruits and is also responsible for 
training their members, they have used 4 shared knowledge principal: 
1) Knowledge transfer; 
2) Knowledge exchange; 
3) Knowledge collectivism; 
4) Knowledge distribution. 
The main goal of the EDL CDU is to get as much practice as possible in the DF’s community 
and to participate in national and international cyber security training events, which have 
set certain restrictions to training and recruitment policies (The Estonian Defence League, 
2018). We have brought out an overview of some of these events (see Annex Services - 
suggested courses and curriculums) and DF’s community requirements which the EDL 
CDU might come up against (see Annex Proposal for Digital Forensic Competency Model 
Framework based DOL Competency Model Tier 9). 
55 
SRQ2 – How to develop and retain DF workforce’s competency in the EDL CDU? We 
answered this question in two parts, firstly “How to develop DF workforce’s competency?” 
and secondly “How to retain DF workforce’s competency in the EDL CDU?” For develop-
ment of DF competencies we have seen fit to combine with the NICE DOL Competency 
framework, DF’s Standard 1.1, revised Bloom’s Taxonomy with changes to DF commu-
nity(see Annex Suggested Instructional Strategies for Digital Forensics Use With Each 
Level of revised Bloom's Taxonomy), and DF ontology model(see Annex Digital Foren-
sic ontology on the example of EDL CDU) to eventually create a task based compe-
tency model(see Annex Proposal for Digital Forensic Competency Model Framework based 
DOL Competency Model). The proposed model is calculated to be with long lasting effects 
though also having a long implementing phase. To have full effect on the EDL CDU, could 
be estimated to take maximum of 5 years (according to validators described in Section As-
sessment of the Digital Forensic’ workforce development plan for the EDL CDU). Imple-
menting phases are divided into 5 groups (see Figure 12): 
1) Capability Mapping 
2) Setting and re-evaluating Goals 
3) Training 
4) Recruitment 
5) Continuous development (falls into second part of SRQ2 – Retaining DF compe-
tency in EDL CDU). 
The model can be used at any time in these phases. Marking evaluations using the GAP 
analyses by “achieved” or “desired”, marking the level of importance by “not applicable”, 
“preferred” or “essential”, used as in recruitment baseline or mapping and planning the 
course/training roadmap. As result of evaluations and remarks by evaluators we have com-
piled a DF workforce’s competency suggestions. Tiers which we focused on were Tiers 5-
7. 
In the second part of SRQ2 – “How to retain DF workforce’s competency?” we suggest our 
proposed model’s 5th phase “Continuous development”, which is supported by the Annex 
Services - suggested courses and curriculums. We provide an overview of the courses, cur-
riculums and exercises which support training in different levels – trainee/student, 
trainer/teacher, evaluator or planner/organizer. We see it as a preventive measure for work-
force stagnation and as a possibility for competency’s continuous development. We empha-
size that the proposed model (especially evaluation of existing specialists) is not intended 
to marginalize the level of expertise and knowledge of existing professionals (an employee 
who exactly meets the needs of his/her position i.e. Windows based specific analyst or An-
droid based analyst), but to highlight the spectrum of competencies in the field of digital 
expertise to encourage professionals and managers to develop their knowledge and to em-
phasize continuous training and development of DF’s skills. With this we insist the EDL 
CDU’s team leaders to see the danger in the following – routine and stagnation, which may 
lead to problems i.e. work errors, lack of motivation, leaving work for new knowledge and 
challenges. 
SRQ3 – What are the means of validating the workforce development roadmap? We 
focused on validating the proposed workforce’s training and development roadmap accu-
racy by assessment from Estonia’s leading experts in the field. In conclusion we can answer 
by emphasizing that to improve and validate the EDL CDU's competency in the DF’s com-
munity the main goal is to raise the volume of collaboration in investigations, participation 
in co-operated exercises and gaining more feedback from partner organizations about their 
results. This will ultimately raise their credibility and in turn increases their involvement in 
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protecting Estonia’s information infrastructure and supporting broader objectives of na-
tional defence (The Estonian Defence League, 2018). 
In conclusion to answer our MRQ - How to create an effective Digital Forensic work-
force’s competency based (competency structure) development and retainment model 
for the EDL CDU’s staff, we must first assess our current situation for the DF community 
(standards, requirements, etc.) and our target audience (to analyze what tasks are involved, 
what activities they are involved with and under what conditions, perform GAP analyses). 
From there, we can start comparing which existing models of competency development are 
best suited to our ability to provide workforce training. If the suitable model is chosen it 
needs to be tailored to the needs of the organization and reviewed to support collaboration 
with partners and workforce’s continuous development. All of this, however, must be based 
on the DF community’s supportive certifiable competencies. 
5.2 Threats to Validity 
As discussed in this paper, certain situations may endanger the validity of this model’s eval-
uation results. 
Risks to the internal and external validity of the research plan can mean that factors outside 
the EDL CDU’s partner institutions may evaluate the results of the assessment. By ensuring 
internal validity, we want to make sure that our proposed model has the desired effect on 
the EDL CDU, whether our experimental model makes a difference and there is sufficient 
evidence to support the claim. 
History – specific events that occur between measurements. For example, while awaiting 
for the results of the evaluation, there was a change in the internal staff policy and develop-
ment plan of the partner organization, the results of which were not reflected by the evalu-
ators, as the changes were not implemented 100% and there was no experience that could 
be reflected in the assessment. Additionally, these changes would be welcomed in terms of 
updating the model and updating the requirements and recommendations for the develop-
ment of the workforce in the light of technological developments and the introduction of 
new solutions in cyber crime. 
Maturation – Due to this model’s long process, i.e. measuring competence, introduction of 
the changes and overall adaptability of the organization to use this model can last up to five 
years. Some employees, partner institutions can change their positions and priorities in terms 
of competences. 
Testing – The effect of conducting a second experiment may already indicate changes in the 
organization's focus and priorities. This, in turn, would allow the model to be improved 
within the organization (goal setting) and within the framework (upgrading the list of com-
petences). 
Instrumentation – Changes in the observers and assessors of the EDL CDU and their affili-
ated partner organizations may differ in time due to the changes to the organization’s inter-
nal structural changes, personnel policies, and focus. In addition, a change in the result may 
also be considered as adding competencies to this model over time. 
Statistical regression – This risk is due to the choice of topics, taking into account the per-
sonal assessment of the supervisors and specialists, based on their view of the organizations’ 
priorities. Differences may occur if assessment is done by groups of newly appointed vs 
experienced specialists/experts and supervisors. 
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Selection of subjects – As we mentioned, we chose a specific group of people and an organ-
ization to conduct our evaluation and we suggest avoiding randomization of the group cho-
sen for the assessment as these may show differences between our findings and later testing. 
Attrition – Professionals involved in the first assessment may see the full deployment and 
ability of this model, although we are not sure whether these specialists will remain working 
in their organization throughout the model, due to job changes within the company, as well 
as the possibility of an external career change. Those who remain in the organization until 
the model has reached the final fifth level may be more motivated to participate in the train-
ing and reach the level of experts. 
We marked four contextual factors that may jeopardize the validity of our model.  
First threat is, the fact that all the evaluators thought this whole spectrum of competencies 
is required from one person, and left out the chance of evaluating the whole unit. Thus their 
point of view, finding a person who has all the competencies, is almost impossible to 
achieve. Not to mention, training traits and values in Tier 1 i.e. compassion is something 
that is obtained in early childhood and later it may be through a psychotherapist. What this 
table is good for is being a good guide to all the skills and requirements that one person 
could look for. 
Second threat is proving the effectiveness of low time and resource costs in developing a 
fully trained specialist. The model should provide certain areas to be more distinguishable - 
what are the key skills of a position and what are the skills that support key skills. For ex-
ample, network forensics skills are supported by network knowledge. At the moment it only 
reads that this skill is necessary when the relationship is incomprehensible. Relationships 
would help a lot in "tuning" a person's skills. 
Thirdly it was noted that the model might not be used for internal performance management 
and reporting because these assessment systems are often highly divisive and can harm mo-
rale to the detriment of overall organizational performance, unless managed very well. The 
size and complexity of the model would make it hard to apply to such performance man-
agement systems. 
Lastly we are accepting the fact that having one profile of a forensics’ analyst is not realistic. 
Especially in the context of EDL CDU, where there are volunteers, not necessarily being 
forensics professionals in their daily jobs. Through evaluators’ recruitment experience it can 
be shown that is very difficult to identify professionals (so called versatilists), who have the 
skillset and knowledge wide and deep enough to fit in any possible digital forensics’ sce-
nario. 
5.3 Conclusion  
This is a primary theoretical assessment that has not been hardened in real life. Certainly the 
need for functions could be improved if EDL CDU could act as an active unit with this 
competency model for 1-2 years. It is important to keep in mind that the EDL CDU is a 
quite mobile and versatile unit and that the newly formulized team model consists of a static 
(management) and dynamic (team experts) part. The team must have enough hardware, soft-
ware and skills to independently deliver the criminality in the cyber area with all the princi-
pals and practices of forensic field in order to use the data collected later by the prosecutor's 
office It should be taken into account that the team has communication with the main center, 
but must be prepared for the loss of the communication and the team itself has to deal with 
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the skills acquired and what they have. At expert level, there should be a very comprehen-
sive digital forensic capability with legislation, document management systems, psycholog-
ical and, in addition, physical properties above average.  
EDL CDU Digital Evidence Handling team is taking more of RRT role and therefore taking 
into account evaluation suggestions – 5 different profiles of a forensics professionals have 
been mapped. The competency requirements will depend on the profile (suggestions are 
brought out in Annex VIII): 
1) First line forensics professional – responsible for data acquisition and basic anal-
ysis (based on step by step procedures and available tools) 
2) Digital forensics analyst – he is a second line analyst with wide overall 
knowledge and skills, being able to use more sophisticated forensics tools and 
have understanding of forensics aspects related to widely used IT products, such 
as Windows, Linux, android operating systems and their file systems, being able 
to perform not overly complex malware analysis, memory analysis, etc. 
3) Digital forensics expert – is an expert in particular field of IT, e.g. expert in static 
malware analysis, Windows internals, Lotus notes mail server, Oracle e-business 
software, proprietary, non-standard database, a PLC, particular router etc. The 
idea is to identify as much as possible of different niche, specialist profiles, map 
some names to the profiles (people coming from industry, academia, partner or-
ganizations or nations) and call them only in cases when their particular 
knowledge is needed. 
4) Incident handler – is responsible for overview of nontechnical forensics activity 
and has a coordination responsibility 
5) Team manager – technical lead of a team of forensic analysts, in situation of 
bigger cyber unit or RRT team with a team of forensics professionals 
Although these roles have been regarded as separate level of expertise, all members must be 
able to do everything – quickly adapt into new roles and situations if needed. This also 
means that the team leader / assistant / manager has to understand what the team is doing, 
this perception only occurs when the processes themselves have been passed and knowledge 
exists. We suggest EDL CDU to have big number of first line analysts, smaller amount of 
second line analysts (more expert professionals), and a number of deep specialists/experts, 
each in his/her own field and develop relations with partner organizations for more training 
possibilities. 
5.4 Future Work 
For further work, we have identified the proposed validation of a structural change through 
real-time use (training / exercises) and recording corrections. Secondly, we see testing the 
competency model in a real-life situation, using the team provided by the EDL CDU. Third, 
as a continuous work – upgrading the competency list of model and preparing tests for 
measuring competencies. A later goal would be to find a cost-effective action plan for the 
EDL CDU. The EDL CDU sees the opportunity to develop a similar competency-based 
model for other roles. In the long run, we will see that the next step should be to combine 
competency-based models between the EDL CDU and partner organizations to achieve a 
better domestic cyber security community as a whole. 
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I. Digital Forensic ontology on the example of EDL CDU 
 
 
Figure 16 Proposal for complete Digital Forensic ontology for EDL CDU 
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II. Overview of standards regulating Digital Forensic community  
Applicability of standards to investigation process classes and activities can be seen Figure 
18, overview of these standards associated with DF’s are: 
ISO/IEC 15489-1:2016 – Defines the basic concepts and principals for creating, collecting 
and managing records regardless of structure or form, in all types of business and techno-
logical environments (International Organization for Standardization). 
ISO/IEC 17025:2017 – Specifies the general requirements for the competence, impartiality 
and consistent operation of laboratories (International Organization for Standardization). 
ISO/IEC 21043:2018 – Defines different components of the forensic process from scene to 
courtroom in Forensic sciences such as the detection and collection of physical evidence, 
the subsequent analysis and interpretation of the evidence, and the reporting of results and 
findings (as illustrated in Figure 17) (International Organization for Standardization). 
 
Figure 17 Relationship between the various components in the forensic process and the 
clauses within the ISO 21043 series (International Organization for Standardization). 
ISO/IEC 23081-1 and 2:2009 – Defines the generic metadata types both for records entities 
as well as other entities that need to be managed in order to document and understand the 
context of records and also identifies, for key entities, a minimum number of fixed aggre-
gation layers that are required for interoperability purposes (International Organization for 
Standardization). 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 – “Specifies the requirements for establishing, implementing, main-
taining and continually improving an information security management system within the 
context of the organization” (International Organization for Standardization). 
ISO/IEC 27032:2012 – Provides guidance for improving the state of Cyber security, draw-
ing out the unique aspects of that activity and its dependencies on other security domains 
(International Organization for Standardization). 
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ISO/IEC 27035-1 and 2:2016 – Part 1 outlines the basic concepts and steps for managing 
information security incidents and how to manage incident management by combining these 
concepts with principals with a structured approach to detect, report, evaluate and respond-
ing to incidents, and apply lessons learnt. Part 2 addresses the development of guidelines to 
increase the confidence of an organization’s actual readiness to respond to an information 
security incident. This is achieved through the management of case management policies 
and plans, as well as on the creation of team response times and the results achieved over 
time, by taking lessons learnt and evaluating them (International Organization for 
Standardization).  
ISO/IEC 27037:2012 – Provides detailed guidance on the identification, collection and/or 
acquisition, marking, storage, transport and preservation of electronic evidence, particularly 
to maintain its integrity (International Organization for Standardization). Devices that are 
affected by this ISO are storage media, mobile phones, cameras, computers e.g.  
ISO/IEC 27038:2014 – Specifies the features of digital editing techniques for digital docu-
ments and also specifies the requirements for software editing tools and test methods for 
ensuring that digital editing is securely completed (International Organization for 
Standardization).  
ISO/IEC 27040:2015 – Provides overview of concepts for data storage security in an organ-
ization and contains references to other international standards and technical reports on ex-
isting practices and techniques that can be applied to secure data storage (International 
Organization for Standardization). 
ISO/IEC 27041:2015 – Provides guidance on mechanisms for ensuring that methods and 
processes used in the investigation of information security incidents are "fit for purpose", 
by ensuring that the appropriate methods and tools are used properly. “It should be applied 
prior to any investigation, in the context of principals and processes (defined in ISO/IEC 
27043:2015) and sound preparation and planning (defined in ISO/IEC 27035-2) to ensure 
the suitability of methods to be applied in the investigative processes described in ISO/IEC 
27037:2012 and ISO/IEC 27042:2015” (International Organization for Standardization). 
ISO/IEC 27042:2015 – Provides guidance on the analysis and interpretation of digital evi-
dence in a manner which addresses issues of continuity, validity, reproducibility, and re-
peatability. It covers what happens after digital evidence has been collected i.e. its analysis 
and interpretation (International Organization for Standardization). 
ISO/IEC 27043:2015 – Provides guidelines based on idealized models for common incident 
investigation processes across various incident investigation scenarios involving digital ev-
idence. Conclusively covers the broader incident investigation activities, within which fo-
rensics usually occur (International Organization for Standardization). 
ISO/IEC 27050 (in 4 parts) concerns electronic discovery. Part 1 (2016) is giving overview 
of eDiscovery, defining terms, concepts, processes etc. Part 2 (2018) describes how tech-
nical and non-technical personnel at management can identify and take ownership of risks 
related to electronic discovery. Part 3 (2017) basically generic how-to-do-it guide laying out 
the key elements that shall form the basis of many DF manuals in future. Also this document 
offers guidance on the seven main steps of eDiscovery noted above (ESI identification, 
preservation, collection, processing, review, analysis and production). Part 4 which is under 
development, will be providing guidance on the ways an organization can plan and prepare 
for electronic discovery from the perspective of both technology and processes 
(International Organization for Standardization). 
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ISO/IEC 29100:2011 – This standard is intended for information and communication tech-
nology (ICT) systems for the protection of personally identifiable information (PII) also 
knows as personal data). The connection is through some privacy limitations on the use of 
custodian data in eDiscovery. In particular, there might be some restrictions on personally 
identifiable information (PII). This applies to natural persons and organizations involved in 
the identification, procurement, architecture, design, development, testing, maintenance, 
management, and management of information and communication technology systems or 
services for which identification information is required to control the processing of PII 
(International Organization for Standardization). 
ISO/IEC 30121:2015 – This standard provides a framework for organizations to prepare 
them for a digital investigation before they occur and it applies to the organizations the 
development of strategic processes relating to the disclosure, maintenance, availability and 
cost-effectiveness of digital evidence (International Organization for Standardization). 
BS 10008:2014 – This standard outlines best practice for transferring electronic information 
between systems and migrating paper records to digital files and furthermore it gives guide-
lines for managing the availability and accessibility of any records that could be required as 
evidence (International Organization for Standardization). 
 
Figure 18 Applicability of standards to investigation process classes and activities 
(International Organization for Standardization). 
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III. EDL CDU structure plan after NICE Framework implementation to Digital Evidence Handling Group structure 
Professional specialization
Team building phase
•Mentoring
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Digital 
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Figure 19 New EDL CU structure plan 
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IV. EDL CDU structure plan after implemented NICE Framework Com-
ponent relationship
Specialty:Category:Organization
EDL CDU
Investigative
Digital Forensics/Cyber 
Investigation
Collect and Operate
Collection Operations
Cyber Operational 
Planning
Cyber Operations
Securely Provision Test and Evaluation
OSINT
Oversee and Govern
Legal Advice and 
Advocacy
Training, Education and 
Awareness
Cybersecurity 
Management
Strategic Planning and 
Policy
Executive Cyber 
Leadership
Program/Project 
Management and 
Acquisitions
Communications and 
Information Technology 
Department
Figure 20 EDL CDU after implemented NICE Framework Component 
relationship 
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V. Suggested Instructional Strategies for Digital Forensics Use With 
Each Level of revised Bloom's Taxonomy 
Activities 
   Workshops   Research projects 
   Training   Problem statements 
Facts  Practice   Case studies 
Study  Exercises  Case studies Creative Exercises 
Lectures  Demonstrations  Research projects Development Plans 
Visual Aides  Projects Problems Exercises Constructs 
Audio and Video Mentoring Visualizations Full-Scale Exercise (FSE) Critiques Simulations management 
Narrative Examples Online self-study Simulations Case Studies Simulations Exercise management 
Illustrations Questions Role Play Critical Incidents Appraisals Evaluation forms 
Analogies Discussion Presentations Discussion Validate training Workflow management 
Conferences Reviews Functional Exercise (FE) Questions Evaluate equipment Team management 
Tutorials Objective Tests Full-Scale Exercise (FSE) Tests Evaluate techniques Promote awareness 
Tabletop Exercise (TTX) Assessments Operations-based Exercise Exams Evaluate processes Develop competence 
Drills Reports Examinations Identify gaps Evaluate plans CREATING 
Seminars Tutoring Practise interoperability Explore issues EVALUATING Adapt 
Games Presentations Demonstrate capabilities ANALYSING Agree Arrange 
Standards Writing Assignments APPLYING Advertize Anticipate Build 
Concepts UNDERSTANDING Act Analyze Appraise Change 
KNOWLEDGE Associate Administer Appraise Argue Choose 
Ask Cite Apply Assume Assess Collect 
Choose Classify Aqcuire Break down Award Combine 
Copy Compare Attack Calculate Choose Compile 
Count Contrast Build Categorize Compare Compose 
Define Demonstrate Capture Classify Conclude Construct 
Discover Describe Change Compare Confirm Create 
Enumerate Discover Contain Conclusion Consider Delete 
Find Discuss Conduct Connect Criteria Design 
How Distinguish Construct Contrast Criticize Develop 
Label Estimate Coordinate Correlate Decide Discuss 
List Explain Defend Criticize Deduct Elaborate 
Listen Express Demonstrate Debate Defend Estimate 
Match Extend Develop Deduce Determine Formulate 
Memorize Generalize Detect Devise Disprove Happen 
Name Give examples Experiment with Detect Estimate Imagine 
Observe Identify Identify Differentiate Evaluate Improve 
Omit Illustrate Illustrate Discover Explain Intervene 
Recall Infer Inform Dissect Find errors Invent 
Recite Interpret Interpret Distinguish Grade Make 
Recognize Outline Interrupt Divide Importance Make up 
Record Relate Interview Examine Influence Manage 
Relate Rephrase Make use of Experiment Interpret Maximize 
Repeat Represent Hunt down Explain Judge Minimize 
Reproduce Research Model Function Justify Modify 
Retell Restate Modify Group Mark Organize 
Select Review Operate Inference Measure Original 
Show Rewrite Organize Inspect Opinion Originate 
Spell Show Pen test Inventory Perceive Plan 
State Sort Perform List Persuade Predict 
Tabualte Summarize Plan Motive Prioritize Prepare 
Tell Translate Practice Observe Prove Propose 
What  Predict Order Rank Promote 
When  Produce Outline Rate Schematize 
Where  Report Point out Recommend Set up 
Which  Resolve Prioritize Reframe Solution 
Who  Schedule Process Revise Solve 
Why  Select Question Rule on Structure 
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Visualize  Simulate Relationships Score Suppose 
   Sketch Select Select Test 
   Solve Simplify Summerize Theory 
   Teach Subdivide Support Validate 
   Transfer Survey Value   
   Track Take part in    
   Utilize Test for    
   Recover Theme    
   Write     
Action Verbs 
Tabel 1 Suggested Instructional Strategies for Digital Forensics Use with Each Level of 
revised Bloom's Taxonomy 
Tartu 2019 
VI. Proposal for new Digital Forensic discipline – Unmanned Systems 
As unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV’s) have become more affordable, Smart Vehicles, Self-
driving cars, Autonomous trucks (Davis, 2016) already hitting, the remote-controlled cargo 
ships are not far left behind. The threats for criminal misuses of these multi-complex sys-
tems is looking to be increasingly troublesome for both the users and the investigators. The 
interest in unmanned systems (UMS) by the general public has made car manufacturers 
(Lee, 2018) and UAV companies doing extensive research and investment in these recent 
years (Metcalfe, 2018) making it more likely to see these autonomous systems doing the 
biddings of average Joe, by the end of next decade (Brandom, 2018). While self-driving cars 
are thing of the future, UAV’s are already present practice. Whilst common practice with 
these UAV’s remain for the hobbyist and enthusiast, they are already fully used in many 
areas e.g. law enforcement (Gettinger, 2018), agricultural (Postscapes, 2018), sports, media 
and journalism (Ducharme, 2014). The need for forensical expertise arises when despite 
legitimate uses, the UAV’s is being used for misconduct and or hijacked or tampered by 
third-party for criminal indent e.g. flying drugs in prisons (Ford, 2018). Cases where there 
is a need for forensic analysis of these devices in order to establish the chain of events. 
Forensic specialists must conduct acquisition and analysis of the device's internal storage, 
on-board flight data, captured media and operating system as well as the device can be con-
trolled via Android and iOS devices. The proposed UMS taxonomy (see Figure 21 UMV 
Forensic taxonomy) will try to cover the aspects of all forensical field categories which the 
specialist should be familiarize himself. As far as the self-driving car forensic goes, the 
investigations is being done internally by the companies themselves as they try to limit the 
possibilities of commercial espionage. Although recent accidents which had lethal results, 
had to regard law enforcement as well still to what extent. The judistical system is not ready 
for autonomous cars as the first lethal cases have showed, as investigators try to decide who 
is to blame in these kinds of accidents (Bogost, 2018). On the other hand we can relate more 
freely with terms of UAV’s. They are operated either by remote control or autonomously 
using onboard computers. The physical elements onboard a drone employ a network of sen-
sors and actuators same as self-driving cars, that communicate with the ground control sys-
tem via a wireless link. This meaning the UAV as well as any UMS system is vulnerable to 
attacks that target either the cyber and/or physical elements of these systems (e.g. the inter-
face or software, data link). Perfect example of these elements being used against UAV’s 
was in 2011 December, when U.S. Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel stealth drone was 
hijacked by Iranian cyber warriors in mid-flight (Keller, 2016). It is thought that mix of 
cyber-attacks were behind of capturing the U.S UAV. The weakest point was said to be the 
drones GPS which the Iranian engineers made spoofing attack to calibrate it to land on the 
“safe” base on Iranian soil. All communications were jammed (satellite and ground control) 
(Owano, 2011) (Altawy & Youssef, 2016). This said, it has to be noted that almost any UAV 
or other UMS manufacturer involved in command and control, streaming sensor downlinks 
or any other wireless connections (shown in taxonomy as Data link and Communication 
type) could be targeted and any system can be hijacked and hacked. These flaws still exist 
and although the manufacturers have made patches to fix them, they cannot foresee solutions 
for every kind of attack vector. Depending of the size or platform of the UMS’s, they will 
have number of different systems on board to operate. Thus we have proposed for the new 
sub-divison of UMS forensics to be introduces as a separate sub-discipline in DF Standard. 
The cameras, radar, LIDAR, vehicle state monitoring, environmental mapping and obstacle 
detection, collision avoidance systems are just some examples which are present in autono-
mous vehicles (equally present at marine, aerial and ground vehicles). 
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Figure 21 UMV Forensic taxonomy 
All these systems are prone to flaws, malfunctions and attacks. Although these capabilities 
will be fusion together to perform as one navigation system, combining multiple sensor in-
formation and thus eliminating individual system or sensor error (Poikonen, et al., 2016). 
All platforms have GPS systems onboard and as previously mentioned, these are being seen 
one weakest points. Route planning via predefined waypoints may be recalculated by out-
side “force” and send vehicle to its new home base or even worse make cargo ships, drone 
or cars crash regardless if passengers are on board or not (Charette, 2012). Leaving GPS 
tampering aside, there shall be still possibility of spoofing attack against LIDAR24, radar25 
or weather monitoring systems to make vehicle immobile of force them to return to base or 
harbor. A multi-thousand dollar system (LIDAR) was proven to be vulnerable by a $60 
dollar setup (Raspberry Pi or an Arduino) (Harris, 2015), by putting fake objects anywhere 
near the vehicle, making it do perform sudden actions. Upcoming 5G promises to bring 
autonomous vehicles to all new level of safety and convenience. Advanced Driver Assis-
tance Systems (ADAS) introduces new automotive ecosystem where sensor fusions with, 
previously mentioned RADAR, LIDAR and camera combination will be combine with 
                                                 
24 Light Detection and Ranging system – scanning laser sensor technology for distance measurement. 
25 Radio Detection and Ranging system - to determine the range, angle, or velocity of objects. 
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Ethernet networking, high definition mapping with high precision navigation, and artificial 
intelligence. We use the “AI” definition by Kaplan and Haenlein – “a system’s ability to 
correctly interpret external data, to learn from such data, and to use those learnings to 
achieve specific goals and tasks through flexible adaptation” (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2019) 
e.g. route planning and collision avoidance. This meaning there will be new possible attack 
vectors against remote or automotive systems. 5G coming also means developing and adapt-
ing wireless communication technologies like vehicle-2-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-2-network 
(V2N), vehicle-2-infrastructure (V2I), vehicle-2-pedestrian (V2P), vehicle-2-utility (V2U), 
and vehicle-2-everything or vehicle broadcasting (V2X). Vehicles will be “talking” to each 
other (real-time road conditions, pre- and post-collision warning, blind spot awareness), 
sharing real-time traffic information, SOS calls, reading roadside signs and sharing the 
changes found. Vehicles will additionally be able to interact with pedestrians (connecting 
to pedestrians smart device to inform them in case they might not see the vehicle approach) 
and refueling stations or power grid (hybrid or electrical vehicles contact charging stations) 
(Keysight Technologies, 2018). 
This taxonomy highlights the future subdivision of prospective expertise, according to 
which a prospective specialist can plan the application of his/her competence. This list is 
not to regarded as a complete, as the UMS, driverless cars or autonomous vehicles have not 
yet been fully developed and proved to be failsafe and completely secure (from both self-
inflicted mistakes and outside cyber-attacks). 
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VII. Services - suggested courses and curriculums 
This Annex will give a brief overview of our suggested courses and curriculums which will 
provide some of the necessary training topics for our proposed competency model listing. 
Disclaimer - This is not complete list of possible courses, however it gives to the DF work-
force development (in this case mostly for the EDL CDU) the selection courses which will 
be useful in fulfilling necessary competency level. We will give our suggestions for DF 
specialist competency roadmap specific courses and training possibilities which should ful-
fill EDL CDU needs as they may be called for upon Regulation No. 108. Course list consist 
training and course providers such as CCDCOE, SANS, CompTIA, Mile2, TalTech, UT, 
ENISA and many more. Additionally we will list the FBI’s Tier 1-3 Cyber backgrounds 
chart what are the preferred degrees and certificates.  
CCDCOE’s mission is to enhance the capability, cooperation and information sharing 
among NATO nations and partners in cyber defence by virtue of education, research and 
development, lessons learned and consultation (CCDCOE, 2019). On the research part 
CCDCOE is well known to be authors of the “Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Operations” and previous “Tallinn Manual on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Warfare” which are influential resources for legal advisers dealing with 
cyber issues. CCDCOE offers a list of cyber-related courses to share the knowledge in the 
field of cyber security: 
Introductory/Apprentice level courses  
This paragraph gives our suggestion for mandatory courses for newly appointed DF special-
ist who are being introduced to DF tasks and to consolidate their already obtained 
knowledge and skills. 
1. CCDCOE Introduction to Digital Forensics Course and Digital Forensics and Digital 
Evidence course 
Introductory courses on DF and addressed for new specialist on forensic analysis field. Aim 
is to introduce new specialists with DF terminology, methodologies, chain of custody and 
principals of investigation authority. It cares to mention that this course focuses on Windows 
hosts and uses open source software as introductory course to in-depth forensics and reverse 
engineering training. Digital Forensics and Digital Evidence course is mostly a supporting 
course for the introductory course (CCDCOE). 
2. CCDCOE Smartphone Security and Forensics Course 
Perfect introduction to intermediate course for Device Forensics specialist who will be con-
ducting digital evidence collecting and acquisitions. Although this course mainly focuses 
on Android and iOS mobile devices, it is perfect course for practicing same techniques on 
similar smaller devices as the course provides technical challenges and respective solutions 
in order to tackle threats form small-devices (e.g. smartphones, e-readers, personal assistant 
managers) (CCDCOE).  
3. SANS SEC 301 Introduction to Cyber Security 
Perfect for people who are new to information security and in need of an introduction to the 
fundamentals of security and also professionals with basic computer and technical 
knowledge in all disciplines who need to be conversant in basic security concepts, princi-
pals, and terms Introduces core security terms and principals e.g. principal of least privilege 
and the Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA) triad, fundamentals of risk man-
agement, security policy, accountability and computer functions and networking (SANS 
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Institute, 2018). This course also provides an Introduction to cryptography and cyber secu-
rity technologies (e.g. network and device security, malware and anti-malware).  
4. SANS SEC 301 Introduction to Cyber Security 
Perfect for people who are new to information security and in need of an introduction to the 
fundamentals of security and also professionals with basic computer and technical 
knowledge in all disciplines who need to be conversant in basic security concepts, princi-
pals, and terms Introduces core security terms and principals e.g. principle of least privilege 
and the Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA) triad, fundamentals of risk man-
agement, security policy, authentication/authorization/accountability and computer func-
tions and networking. This course also provides an Introduction to cryptography and cyber 
security technologies (e.g. network and device security, malware and anti-malware) (SANS 
Institute).  
5. Mile2 SP 
This is mandatory course for all Cyber Security IT professionals, and should be regarded as 
a stepping-stone course for all DF specialist (especially Network, Device and Computer 
Forensics specialists). Topics which are provided are risk management, cryptography, iden-
tity and access management, data and network security, mobile device and application se-
curity amongst many others. The focus is to fully understanding of risk management and IT 
security in real-world point of view (Mile2, 2018).  
6. Mile2 IHE 
This is apprentice to intermediate level course for First Responders and RRT members who 
have to prevent, detect and respond to cyber-attacks and start the digital evidence handling 
process and procedures (Mile2, 2018). 
7. CompTIA Network+ 
This is a mandatory for course for apprentice Network Forensics specialist who has had 
some networking experience. This basic course covers networking concepts and their im-
plementation, infrastructure, network physical security and common attack vectors and net-
work management26.  
8. ENISA Digital forensics 
Mandatory training material by ENISA for all DF specialist that introduces the principals of 
DF and digital evidence gathering and Chain of custody (ENISA). 
9. ENISA Forensic analysis: Local Incident Response 
This is a follow-up training material for ENISA Digital Forensics which practices incident 
response and investigation processes. Practical value in incident management by systematic 
approach (ENISA). 
10. ENISA Introduction to network forensics 
This online training material has all new version 1.0 released in January 2019 and it focuses 
exclusively in Network Forensics and best practices. Covers topics like, network-based ev-
idence (difference and collection), logging and monitoring, timeline analysis, intrusion de-
tection, SCADA, SSL traffic inspection, possibilities of VPN compromise and chain of cus-
tody amongst many others. Material is free of charge for all ENISA courses and they provide 
virtual images for these courses (ENISA).  
                                                 
26 https://certification.comptia.org/training/certmaster/learn-network 
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11. ENISA Identification and handling of electronic evidence 
This training material will be covering the basic principals of evidence gathering (e.g. image 
clone, live data capture) and verifying the applicability of gathered digital evidence 
(ENISA). 
12. ENISA Building artefact handling and analysis environment 
Apprentice to intermediate training material which is focused on building and practicing 
safe and secure conditions for operating important digital evidence or some form of malware 
(ENISA).  
13. ENISA Processing and storing artefacts 
This Software Forensics (Malware Forensics) apprentice to intermediate training focuses on 
different methods of collecting, sorting and storing artifacts. Specialists will be introduced 
to tools such as Shiva and Viper (ENISA). 
14. ENISA Artefact analysis fundamentals 
This training is the follow-up for previous Malware Forensics course. Topics that will be 
covered are static analysis techniques (string analysis, portable header analysis, import ad-
dress table analysis i.e.), network analysis, behavioral analysis and will be conducting auto-
matic analysis using the Cuckoo Sandbox tool (ENISA). 
15. ENISA Forensic analysis: Network Incident Response 
Practical training material for Network Forensic specialists covering network forensics tech-
niques(collecting and analysing network traffic logs) (ENISA).  
16. ENISA Mobile threats incident handling Part 1 
Mandatory course material for Device Forensics specialist which will introduce concepts, 
tools, and techniques used for mobile devices (e.g. mobile phones, GPS, tablets, personal 
assistants, smartphones). Course material touches also network topics and operating systems 
which the DF specialist must familiarize themselves to perform essential device forensics 
processes (ENISA). 
Intermediate level courses 
1. CCDCOE IT Systems Attack and Defence 
This is must-have course for any DF specialist in any sub-discipline field as this will give 
the experts perfect opportunity to think and see as the attacker. During this course, the spe-
cialists will conduct different so-called Capture the Flag competition type attacks on virtual 
machines and learn different penetration testing methods (e.g. Scanning and Enumeration, 
Privilege Escalation) (CCDCOE, 2019). 
2. SANS FOR498 Battlefield Forensics & Data Acquisition 
This a mandatory introductory/intermediate course for recognizing digital evidence (e.g. 
USB drives, smartphones, digital acquisition from different devices), and the various ways 
to collect them by rapid reaction team members, first responders and law enforcement of-
ficers. This course focuses on digital evidence identification, collection and preserving the 
chain of custody (SANS Institute). 
3. SANS SEC 401 Security Essentials Bootcamp Style 
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Perfect for managerial board who want to understand information security beyond simple 
terminology and concepts although need an understanding of security to be effective, net-
work administrators responsible for maintaining systems that are being targeted by attackers 
and forensic specialists and penetration testers who need a solid foundation of security prin-
cipals to be as effective as possible at their tasks (SANS Institute). Few of these topics that 
will be covered are defensible network architecture, virtualization and cloud security, net-
work device security, networking and protocols, securing wireless networks, securing web 
communications, security policies, critical controls, malicious code and exploit mitigations, 
Linux security, automation, auditing and forensics and many more. 
4. SANS SEC 504 Hacker Tools, Techniques, Exploits, and Incident Handling 
Core course for incident handling teams, system administrators, rapid reaction teams and 
other security personnel first responders. This course covers incident handling and computer 
crime investigation. Incident handling is introduced on a Step-by-Step method by introduc-
tion to the incident handling process, using the six steps (preparation, identification, con-
tainment, eradication, recovery, and lessons learned) which are necessary to prepare for and 
deal with a computer incident. Course also covers the details associated with reconnais-
sance, scanning, gaining access, buffer overflow and format string attack techniques and 
much more. (SANS Institute) 
5. SANS MGMT 512 Security Leadership Essentials For Managers 
Mandatory course for newly-appointed Information or Communication Security personnel 
who have been given leadership responsibilities (team leaders). This course covers what a 
security manager must know to function in today’s environment (e.g. safety, physical secu-
rity, how network protocols work, security, vulnerability) (SANS Institute). Specialists, 
team and project leaders will learn more about budget awareness and project management, 
network infrastructure, computer and network addressing, IP terminology and concepts, vul-
nerability management, managing physical safety and security.  
6. SANS MGTM 525 and 535 - IT Project Management, Effective Communication and 
Incident Response Team Management 
Mandatory for rapid reaction team and incident response team leaders to navigate in difficult 
and highly structured units/organizations and to analyze the data and information provided 
by technical staff, and translate this information into business relevant information that will 
be representable for superiors (SANS Institute). 
7. SANS FOR 500 Windows Forensic Analysis 
This course is essential for any DF specialist. It covers Windows OS components, core fo-
rensic principals, live response and triage-based acquisition techniques, acquisition review 
with write blocker, advanced acquisition challenges, windows image mounting and exami-
nation, file system overviews, document and file metadata, file carving, custom carving sig-
natures, memory and unallocated space analysis, all which are core competencies what 
every DF expert must be familiar if not perfectly obtained (SANS Institute). 
8. Mile2 DFE 
Regarded as essential course for digital evidence handling specialists and first responders 
who are responsible for evaluate, collect and document the digital evidence in focus of fol-
lowing the correct chain-of-custody and write detailed reports, skills needed for most foren-
sic specialists disregarded from their sub-discipline field of expertize (Mile2, 2018).  
9. CompTIA Security+ 
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Targeted to networking and administrative personnel. Gives overview of security funda-
mentals, threats and vulnerabilities, application and host security an implementing network 
security (CompTIA Certifications, 2018). 
10. ENISA Introduction to advanced artefact analysis 
Introductory training material for Computer and Software Forensics specialist giving prac-
tical examples of dynamic and static analysis with OllyDbg debugger and IDA Pro (ENISA) 
a. ENISA Advanced artefact handling – follow-up course.  
11. ENISA Advanced artefact analysis 
Mandatory training material is for Computer and Software Forensics specialist however 
suggested for all DF specialist who’s task involve acquiring and analysing memory images 
from Windows and Linux operating systems. This course should be followed-up by Dy-
namic analysis of artefacts training material and Static analysis of artefacts material 
(ENISA). 
12. ENISA Mobile Threats Incident Handling (Pt II) 
This is mandatory training material Device Forensic specialists which covers mobile, net-
work and malware forensic topics (ENISA). 
Advanced level courses 
1. CCDCOE Industrial Control Systems Security Course  
This course explains security issues of ICS/SCADA environments, and to provide technical 
IT‐staff who are fulfilling roles such as administrators and auditor whose daily duties do not 
necessarily include IC/SCADA‐security, with the knowledge necessary to protect Program-
mable Logic Controllers (PLC) and industrial field devices. It offers hands‐on exercises for 
training as well as taught content (CCDCOE). 
2. CCDCOE Cyber Defence Monitoring Course 
This course is perfect for Network Forensics specialist and who also are participating in 
Locked Shields exercise as a Blue Team member. It provides large-scale packet capture 
analysis with Moloch and gives practical experience in network traffic analysis (CCDCOE). 
3. CCDCOE Malware and Exploit Essentials 
As the name suggests it is essential course for specialist who will be training the Software 
Forensics sub-discipline field as their main specialty. Although this course is far from intro-
ductory course, because specialist who will be attending must already proven himself/her-
self with good or excellent skills in Linux and Windows environments (command line) and 
programming experience in assembler. This course will give you core principals of malware 
and exploit vulnerabilities and insight into intruder techniques. As this is highly technical 
course, it is highly recommended to view this course as Expert level training (e.g. specialist 
has previously gained the knowledge of Tier 6 and 7 in focus of assembler and higher pro-
gramming languages and has proofed programming experience in assembler, C(++) or Py-
thon (CCDCOE). 
4. CCDCOE Web Applications Attack and Defence 
This course is both useful for Network and Software Forensics sub-discipline specialists. 
This course provides basic principals in web application security. Some of the topics cov-
ered are web app firewalls, web app pen-testing, web app vulnerabilities (CCDCOE, 2019). 
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5. SANS FOR 508 Advanced Incident Response, Threat Hunting, and Digital Foren-
sics 
It is intended for experienced DF specialists who want to improve their knowledge of intru-
sion investigation, incident response and expand their understanding of memory and sched-
ule forensic. Course will be covering topics such as real incident response tactics, malware 
persistence identification, memory forensics analysis, event log analysis, advanced evidence 
of execution detection, timeline analysis, malware and anti-forensic detection and contain-
ment and threat intelligence gathering. Course can be summed up with three key activities: 
Detect, identify and perform damage assessment (SANS Institute).  
6. SANS FOR 518 Mac and iOS Forensic Analysis and Incident Response 
This is mandatory advanced course for Ideal for experienced Software, Computer and De-
vice Forensics specialist who have to master Mac and iOS investigative skills. Course 
teaches Mac and iOS essentials and acquisition, thorough understanding of HFS+ file sys-
tem, Mac and iOS triage, log parsing and analysis, Apple applications and password crack-
ing and encrypted containers (SANS Institute).  
7. SANS FOR 572 Advanced Network Forensics: Threat Hunting, Analysis, and Inci-
dent Response 
This advanced Network Forensics specialist hands-on course with Linux SIFT and other 
forensic tools (e.g. tcpdump and Wireshark). Course cover topics like core protocols, log 
aggregation, NetFlow and File Access protocols, wireless network forensics, full-packet 
hunting, Man in the Middle, Network protocol reverse engineering and investigation oper-
ation security and threat intel (SANS Institute). 
8. SANS FOR 578 Cyber Threat Intelligence 
This is a structured cyber threat analysis course for all sub-disciplines of DF specialists, 
especially for Software Forensics specialists (e.g. malware) who want to widen the skillset 
in filesystem forensics, investigations of technically advanced adversaries, incident re-
sponse tactics, and advanced intrusion investigations (SANS Institute). 
9. SANS FOR 585 Smartphone Forensic Analysis In-Depth 
We suggest this as a mandatory course for Device Forensic specialists who are responsible 
in smartphones forensics. Course includes most commonly used smartphone devices with 
OS’s such as Android, iOS, BlackBerry, Windows Phone and Chinese counterparts. Course 
covers different acquisition methods, analysis methods, files of interest, smartphone mal-
ware detection techniques and locating the infection vector (SANS Institute). 
10. SANS FOR 526 Advanced Memory Forensics & Threat Detection 
This advanced level memory forensics course crucial for Computer, Sofware and Device 
Forensic specialists to successfully perform live system memory triage and analyze captured 
memory images. Example of topics covered: List walking and scanning, pool memory, pro-
cess relationships, kernel objects, DLL’s virtual machine descriptors, detection of injected 
codes, user artifacts in memory, Linux/Mac/Windows memory acquisition and analysis 
(SANS Institute). 
11. SANS FOR 610 Reverse-Engineering Malware: Malware Analysis Tools and Tech-
niques 
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As the name already suggest it is meant for Software (Malware) Forensics specialists. This 
advanced level purely technical course looks into real-world malware analysis and how to 
bypass them using a disassembler and a debugger (SANS Institute). 
12. Mile2 VFE 
Course which is for performing virtualization forensic examinations. Target group is foren-
sic investigators and virtual infrastructure specialists (Mile2, 2018). 
13. Mile2 NFE 
Network forensic course that covers investigation and recovery of data in a network, Phys-
ical Interception, Traffic Acquisition, Analysis, Wireless Attacks, and SNORT. “The course 
focuses on the centralizing and investigating of logging systems as well as network devices” 
(Mile2, 2018). 
Curriculums 
The United Kingdom’s has taken education and skills training seriously by adapting indus-
try, government and academia to support the next generation of experts. Teachers, research-
ers, students and cyber security professionals all have been included National Cyber Secu-
rity Centre (NCSC) workforce development model by providing support on Cyber School 
hubs to address the knowledge and skill gap in cyber security and also provide certified 
curriculums in Bachelor’s, Integrated Master’s and Master’s degrees all over the UK. One 
examples is Edinburgh Napier University, which supports international studies and courses 
include software development, introduction to human-computer interaction, programming 
fundamentals, database systems, scripting for cyber security and forensics, digital forensics, 
web technologies, data analytics, networked services, network security and cryptography, 
OS forensics, security systems for lot, security testing and advanced network forensics, se-
cure software development and many more (NCSC, 2019). This is perfect example of gov-
ernment involvement enhancing Cyber Security awareness and improving the possibilities 
of recruiting new specialist.  
Moving closer to Estonia, the Norway provides three bachelor programmes (Cyber Security, 
Digital Forensics and Applied Data Science) which international students can also partici-
pate. Suggested DF curriculum gives an overall knowledge about the protection and re-
search of digital systems and covers core theories, which are combined with practice. 
Amongst of these courses are Problem Based Learning and Research Methodologies, Intro-
duction to Information Security, Professional Aspects of Computing, Introduction to Pro-
gramming, Network Principals, Programming and Databases, Digital Forensics Practice and 
Procedure, Operating File Systems, File System Analysis, Network Security, Wireless and 
Mobile Devices and Digital Investigation (Noroff Education AS).  
Furthermore University of Turku (UTU) in Finland and their Master’s programme in Infor-
mation Security, Cryptography and Security of Networked Systems covers System and Ap-
plication Security, Network Infrastructure Technologies and Security, Human Element in 
Information Security, Management of Information System Security and IT Service Conti-
nuity, Cryptography, Protocol Processing and Security, Secure Sensor Network Systems, 
Software Development and Software Security amongst many other courses which can be 
studied on campus or via online studies (University of Turku).  
Estonian own educational system provides both Bachelor’s and Master’s programmes. 
Bachelor Curriculum by Estonian Information Technology College, provides a higher edu-
cation in broad domain of Cyber Security, integrating Software Development and IT Sys-
tems Administration. Curriculum includes topics like Malware, Network Security, social 
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Engineering, Digital Forensics (disk, network, host), Incident Handling, Intrusion Detection 
amongst other IT System Administration and Development courses (TalTech). Furthermore 
TalTech and UT united Master’s programme, provides three main specializations (Cyber 
Security, Digital Forensics and Cryptography) in depth. This is perfect follow-up to Bache-
lor studies at Estonian Information Technology College. It provides students with core skills 
in the security of information systems and specialized skills in the chosen specialization. 
Student have chance to study under law enforcement, CERT, NATO CCDCOE specialists 
and other industries and institutions (TalTech). Courses topics include Computer Network 
Security, Malware, Data Mining, Cryptology, Secure Programming Techniques, System Fo-
rensics, Cyber Security Management, Network Forensics amongst many other specialized 
courses.  
On the other hand SANS Technology Institute (additionally to single course provider) has 
developed a Masters is Information Security Engineering which is a non-thesis program that 
consist of series of technical, management, and communications SANS courses which are 
focusing on Cyber Defence Operations, Incident Response, Industrial Control Systems, Pen-
etration Testing and Security Management amongst other courses e.g. FOR508, FOR572, 
FOR610 and SEC504 (SANS Technology Institute). 
These are just a few of possible Bachelor’s and Master’s degree courses which can be sug-
gested for DF specialist in EDL CDU as these can done via online studies and by graduating 
a student will be able to achieve the level of competence required in DF core activities in 
the industry. 
Exercises / Competitions / Workshops 
1. CyberCracker 
Exercise type: Awareness study  
Goal: Introduce 10-18-year-old students to digital safety in a olympic like competition man-
ner (Kukk, 2017).  
2. KüberNaaskel (CyberSpike) 
Exercise type: National technical level 
Goal: Promote Estonian Cyber Defence Talent Championship for 14-24 year olds, who will 
be participating at competition held at the Defence Forces Cyber Range. A miniature com-
petition for young people who have not participated in major cyber competitions at primary 
school, upper secondary school, 14-25 years old (Kukk, 2017). 
3. KüberSiil (Cyber Hedhog) 
Exercise type: National operational and strategic level 
Goal: Rehearse the applicability of national comprehensive cyber incident's resolution plan. 
The exercise included emergency response at operational and strategic level, involving part-
ners. The aim was to assess the authorities' responsibilities, rights, readiness and procedures 
for communication (Kukk, 2017). 
4. Crossed Swords 
Exercise type: International technical level 
Goal: To developing technical capabilities in a responsive way. Focuses on penetration test-
ing in a simulated environment where participants are solving various complex tasks e.g. 
such as evidence collection, gathered data analyzation, identification of malicious actions 
(Kukk, 2017). 
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5. Locked Shields 
Exercise type: International technical level 
Goal: Practice the entire chain of command in solving a large-scale a cyber incidents using 
media and legal injections giving training possibilities for legal teams and threat analytics 
not only concentrating to forensic and technical network complexities. Locked Shields is 
known as the largest technical cyber defence exercise, which is held annually since 2010 
and its target group is national security specialists whose profession is to defend IT systems 
in their organizations. Locked Shields is conducted in real-time and using real-life technol-
ogies and networks (Kukk, 2017). 
6. Cyber Coalition 
Exercise type: International technical, operational or strategic level 
Goal: Rehearse existing processes and collaboration between national specialists handling 
different scenarios. Exercise is being held in a simulated environment and all participants 
are solving scenarios, which involved various tasks e.g. malware forensics, device forensics 
and hacking of prescribed networks (Kukk, 2017).  
For comparing purposes we have also listed the FBI’s Cyber backgrounds list of preferred 
Tier 1 – 3 degrees and certificates provided by Mile2 (Mile2, 2018). Tier 1 (Table 1)– low-
risk positions, non-sensitive positions, and positions involving physical and/or logical ac-
cess to government facilities and computer systems, Tier 2 (Table 2)– moderate-risk posi-
tions, non-critical sensitive positions, and positions requiring access to Confidential, Secret 
level information and Tier 3 (Table 3)– high-risk positions, critical sensitive positions, spe-
cial sensitive positions, and positions requiring access to Top Secret and Sensitive Compart-
mented Information (Hederson, 2009). 
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1. C)IHE – Mile 2 Certified Incident Handling Engineer 
2. C)NFE – Mile 2 Certified Network Forensics Examiner 
3. C)NPTE – Mile2 Certified Penetration Testing Engineer 
4. C)PTC – Mile2 Certified Penetration Testing Consultant 
5. C)SWAE – Mile2 Certified Secure Web Applications Engineer 
6. C)VA – Mile2 Certified Vulnerability Assessor 
7. C)WSE – Mile2 Certified Wireless Security Engineer 
8. CCDE – Cisco Certified Design Expert 
9. CCE – ISFCE Certified Computer Examiner 
10. CEH – EC–Council Certified Ethical Hacker 
11. CEPT – Certified Expert Penetration Tester 
12. CFCE – IACIS Certified Forensic Computer Examiner 
13. CHFI – EC Council Computer Hacking Forensic Investigator 
14. CISSP – (ISC)2 Certified Information Systems Security Professional 
15. CNDA – EC Council Certified network Defence Architect 
16. CPT – IACRB Certified Penetration Tester 
17. CREA – IACRB Certified Reverse Engineering Analyst 
18. CSSA – IACRB Certified SCADA Security Architect 
19. CWAPT – IACRB Certified Web Application Penetration Tester 
20. GAWN – GIAC Assessing and Auditing Wireless Networks 
21. GCFA – GIAC Certified Forensic Analyst 
22. GCFE – GIAC Certified Forensic Examiner 
23. GCIA – GIAC Certified Intrusion Analyst 
24. GCIH – GIAC Certified Incident Handler 
25. GCUX – GIAC Certified UNIX Security Administrator 
26. GICSP – GIAC Global Industrial Cyber Security Professional 
27. GMOB – GIAC Mobile Device Security Analyst 
28. GPEN – GIAC Certified Penetration Tester 
29. GPPA – GIAC Certified Perimeter Protection Analyst 
30. GREM – GIAC Reverse Engineering Malware 
31. GSE – GIAC Security Engineer 
32. GWAPT – GIAC Web Application Penetration Tester 
33. GXPN – GIAC Exploit Research and Advanced Penetration Tester 
34. MCSD – Microsoft Certified Solutions Developer 
35. MCSE – Microsoft Certified Solutions Expert 
36. SNFA – GIAC Network Forensic Analyst 
37. SSCP – (ISC)2 Systems Security 
Table 1 FBI’s Cyber backgrounds list of preferred Tier 1 degrees and certificates Mile2 
(Mile2, 2018) 
1. ACE – AccessData Certified Examiner 
2. C)DFE – Mile2 Certified Digital Forensics Examiner 
3. CASS – Certified Application Security Specialist 
4. CCCI – HTCN Certified Computer Crime Investigator 
5. CCDA – CISCO Certified Design Associate 
6. CCDP – Cisco Certified Design Professional 
7. CCFE – IACRB Certified Computer Forensics Examiner 
8. CCFP – (ISC)2 Certified Cyber Forensics Professional 
9. CCIE – Cisco Certified Internetwork Expert 
10. CCNA – Cisco Certified Network Associate 
11. CCNP – Cisco Certified Network Professional 
12. CCWS – IACRB Certified Windows Security Specialist 
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13. CISA – ISACA Certified Information Systems Auditor 
14. CWNE – Certified Wireless Network Engineer 
15. CWNP – Certified Wireless Network Professional 
16. EnCE – Encase Certified Examiner 
17. GCED – GIAC Certified Enterprise Defender 
18. GCWN – GIAC Certified Windows Security Administrator 
19. GSEC – GIAC Security Essentials 
20. LPIC – 2 – Linux Professional Institute – Advanced Level 
21. LPT – EC Council Licensed Penetration Tester 
22. MCSA – Microsoft Certified Solutions Associate 
23. Net+ – CompTIA Network+ 
24. Sec+ – CompTIA Security+ 
25. Server+ – CompTIA Server+ 
26. SSCP – (ISC)2 Systems Security Certified Professional 
Table 2 FBI’s Cyber backgrounds list of preferred Tier 2 degrees and certificates Mile2 
(Mile2, 2018) 
1. A+ – CompTIA A+ 
2. ACSP – Apple Certified Support Professional 
3. ACTC – Apple Certified Technical Coordinator 
4. C)ISSO – Mile2 Certified Information Systems Security Officer 
5. C)SLE – Mile2 Certified Secure Linux Engineer 
6. C)SS – Mile2 Certified Security Sentinel 
7. CCENT – Cisco Certified Entry Networking Technician 
8. CCT – Cisco Certified Technician 
9. GISF – GIAC Information Security Fundamentals 
10. IAM – INFOSEC Assessment Methodology 
11. IEM – INFOSEC Evaluation Methodology 
12. Linux+ – CompTIA Linux+ 
13. LPIC–1 – Linux Professional Institute Certification – Junior Level 
14. TICSA – TrueSecure ICAS Certified Security 
15. VMware – Vmware Certified Professional (vSphere) 
Table 3 FBI’s Cyber backgrounds list of preferred Tier 3 degrees and certificates Mile2 
(Mile2, 2018) 
These are one of many possible courses and trainings which provide excellent competency 
development environments for DF specialist. We urge the EDL CDU and other entities who 
are developing DF workforce competency roadmap to include this model and wide arrange 
of courses to be mandatory part in personnel management. 
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VIII. Proposal for Digital Forensic Competency Model Framework based 
DOL Competency Model 
*Model table will be separate attachment 
